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Brown: Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response

RECONSIDERING THE CORPORATE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: A RESPONSE
TO THE COMPELLED-VOLUNTARY WAIVER
PARADOX
Lonnie T. Brown, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

"[T]he [corporate] attorney-client privilege is under attack today as
never before." 1 "Privileged information used to belong to the client; now
it apparently belongs to the government."'2 "[T]he extent of the erosion
of privilege protections and the level of concern about that erosion
suggest that the system may be nearing a turning point-a point at which
the continued viability of the privilege is at risk.",3 "The sound you hear
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. B.A., Emory
University, 1986; J.D., Vanderbilt Law School, 1989. I would like to express special thanks to
Monroe Freedman, Roy Simon and the Hofstra University School of Law for giving me the
opportunity to participate in their 2005 Legal Ethics Conference. I am honored to have been invited
and my Article benefited greatly from the expert commentary offered by my esteemed legal ethics
contemporaries.
I would also like to thank Ron Ellington and Bruce Green for their careful reads and
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article, and I am very grateful for the input provided
by many of my faculty colleagues at the University of Georgia in connection with a Colloquium
presentation regarding the Article. In addition, I would like to thank Travis Atkinson for his helpful
research assistance. And last, but never least, my most heartfelt thanks is reserved for my wife Kim,
whose support, encouragement and insights make everything that I do better.
1. Ronald C. Minkoff, A Leak in the Dike: Expanding the Doctrine of Waiver of the
Attorney-Client Privilege (2002 Update), in ETHICS AFTER ENRON: PROTECTING YOUR FIRM OR
CORPORATE LAW DEPARTMENT: A SATELLITE PROGRAM 195, 199 (PLI New York Practice Skills,
Course Handbook Series No. FO-OOGL, 2002), available at WL 126 PLIINY 195; accord Kathryn
Keneally, White Collar: Threat to the Corporation'sAttorney-Client Privilege and Work Product
Immunity, CHAMPION, Feb. 2001, at 53 [hereinafter Keneally, Threat] ("[T]he protections accorded
by the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity for corporations are under attack.").
2. Joseph P. Savage, Jr. & Melissa M. Longo, "Waive" Goodbye to Attorney-Client
Privilege, CORP. COUNS., Mar. 2001, at 5.
3. Lance Cole, Revoking OurPrivileges: FederalLaw Enforcement's Multi-FrontAssault on
the Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why it is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REv. 469, 586-87 (2003).
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coming from the corridors of the Department of Justice is a requiem
marking the death of privilege in corporate criminal investigations." 4
These quotes are representative of the widespread sentiment within
the corporate legal community concerning the perceived increased
vigilance of certain government agencies to obtain voluntary waivers of
the attorney-client privilege and work product protection in exchange for
possible prosecutorial or reguilatory leniency. Most notably, the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") has adopted guidelines that seem to make
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product protection a
prerequisite for being deemed "cooperative," a significant designation
that carries with it the prospect for more favorable penal treatment.5 In
addition, the United States Sentencing Commission underscored the
potential importance of such waivers by approving an amendment to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 2004 that, under certain circumstances,
makes privilege waiver a factor in assessing a corporation's "culpability
score," which is used in determining the appropriate sentencing range. 6

4. David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink ofa Brave New World: The Death of
Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 147, 147 (2000). For further
expressions of alarm regarding the state of the attorney-client privilege and work product protection,
see generally American College of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and
Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L. REv. 307 (2003); David
Krakoff & Ilana Sultan, For Clients' Sake: Under Assault From Government and the ABA, the
Privilege Needs Defenders, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at 34.
5. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson to Heads of
Department Components and U.S. Attorneys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations
(Jan.
20,
2003)
[hereinafter
Thompson
Memo],
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate__guidelines.htm; Memorandum from Deputy Attorney
General Eric H. Holder, Jr., to Heads of Department Components and U.S. Attorneys on Bringing
Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), reprinted in Justice Department Guidance
on Prosecutions of Corporations, 66 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 189 (Dec. 8, 1999) [hereinafter Holder
Memo]; see also infra notes 187-95 and accompanying text; Robert A. Del Giorno, Corporate
Counsel as Government's Agent: The Holder Memorandum and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307,
CHAMPION, Aug. 2003, at 22, 23 (suggesting that it is somewhat disingenuous for the DOJ to
maintain that waiver of privilege is not an absolute prerequisite to a finding of "cooperation," given
the government's view that "a corporation's failure to disclose privileged information [represents]
an effort to hide the truth"); Minkoff, supra note 1,at 202-03 (maintaining that the "Holder
Memorandum is just an example of the extraordinary pressure prosecutors place on corporate
targets in criminal cases to disclose attorney-client information").
6. See Kathryn Keneally, Corporate Compliance Programs: From the Sentencing
Guidelines to the Thompson Memorandum and Back Again, CHAMPION, June 2004, at 42, 46
[hereinafter Keneally, Corporate Compliance]; Allan Van Fleet, Sentencing Guidelines
Amendments Jeopardize the Attorney-Client Privilege for Organizations, PROF'L LIAB. LITIG.
ALERT, Winter 2005, at 1. The Amendment, which went into effect on November 1, 2004, added
the following commentary to Section 8C2.5: "Waiver of attorney-client privilege and work product
protections is not a prerequisite to a reduction in culpability score ... unless such waiver is
necessary in order to provide timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information known to
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In light of such developments, corporations and their counsel
understandably feel great pressure to abandon the time-honored
sanctuary of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine
when confronted with a government investigation. Although prosecutors
and other agency officials maintain that waiver is never required or
compelled 7 and also dispute claims that it is routinely requested,8 there is
a growing body of evidence to the contrary. 9 Moreover, even if the
the organization." U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5, cmt. 12 (2004); see
also Van Fleet, supra, at 7.
It is important to note, however, that as a result of efforts by the ABA and other
organizations, on April 5, 2006, the Sentencing Commission reversed its position, voting to
eliminate the waiver commentary from Section 8C2.5. See Peggy Aulino, Sentencing Commission
Changes Provision that Critics Have Charged Undercut Privilege, 22 Laws. Man. On Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) 193, 193 (April 19, 2006). Unless Congress intervenes, the revision will take
effect on November 1, 2006. See id.Though certainly a very positive development for the corporate
bar, it seems unlikely that this change will significantly affect the DOJ's stance regarding privilege
waiver. For further discussion regarding the Sentencing Guidelines as they pertain to the waiver
issue, see Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperationby Business Organizationsand the Impact of
Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 593-94, 607-10 (2004); see also infra notes 23339 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Joan C. Rogers, DOJ Official Suggests CorporateDefendants Do Not Have to
Waive Privilege, but it Helps, 21 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 391, 391 (July 27,
2005) (reporting Acting Assistant Attorney General John C. Richter's assertion that "waiver of
privilege is not a requirement and is not a litmus test for cooperation with the government"); Philip
Urofsky, Interview With UnitedStates Attorney James B. Comey RegardingDepartment ofJustice's
Policy on Requesting Corporations Under Criminal Investigation to Waive the Attorney Client
Privilegeand Work Product Protection,in CORP. COUNS. F. 2004, at 639, 642 (PLI Corporate Law
& Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1421, 2004) (reporting U.S. Attorney James Comey's
position that "[t]he Principlesdo not require waiver, and do not even require cooperation"). But see
Van Fleet, supra note 6, at 7 (observing that "[a]t least one U.S. Attorney has publicly called for a
complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege by all corporate targets wishing to obtain credit for
their cooperation"). For the language of the Holder and Thompson Memos that suggests waiver is
not mandatory, see infra note 191 and accompanying text.
8. See Buchanan, supra note 6, at 598 (discussing the results of a survey of the ninety-four
U.S. Attorneys' Offices conducted in 2002 by the U.S. Sentencing Commission Ad Hoc Advisory
Group, which "revealed that requests for waiver.., were the exception rather than the rule");
Marcia Coyle, Lawyers Fear a DOJ 'Culture of Waiver', NAT'L L.J., Mar. 13, 2006, at 13 (noting
that the "Justice Department maintains today that waivers are not the norm").
9. See generally AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, ASS'N OF CORP. COUNS. ET AL., THE DECLINE
OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT - SURVEY RESULTS (March
2006) [hereinafter COALITION SURVEY], available at http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient2.pdf;
ASS'N OF CORP. COUNS., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL SURVEY:
Is THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE UNDER ATTACK? (Apr. 2005) [hereinafter ACC SURVEY],
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/publichearing2005O42 I/testimony/
hackettl .pdf; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS SURVEY: THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IS UNDER ATrACK (Apr. 2005) [hereinafter NACDL SURVEY], available at
http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient nacdl.pdf; see also Richard Ben-Veniste & Lee H. Rubin,
DOJ Reaffirms and Expands Aggressive Corporate Cooperation Guidelines, LEGAL
BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 4, 2003, at 1, 1, available at http://www.mayerbrownrowe.com/
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corporate legal community is collectively exaggerating the zeal and
frequency with which waiver is being urged, it is impossible to dispute
that the potential for what amounts to compelled-voluntary waiver
represents a legitimate fear.
This perceived ever-present concern has caused many corporate
executives and their counsel to question the continued efficacy of the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. In particular, they
contend that the escalating pressure to waive these protections is eroding
the desired atmosphere of mutual candor and trust that has traditionally
been the hallmark of the attorney-client relationship, which, in turn, is
adversely affecting counsel's desire and ability to conduct the thorough
factual investigations' 0 lauded by the Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v.
United States. "
The upshot, so the argument goes, is the inevitable provision of
ineffective legal representation. 12 More precisely, the parade of horribles
envisaged include: (1) the erosion of trust between attorney and clientcorporate executives and employees will cease to be forthcoming out of3
a fear that whatever they communicate will ultimately be disclosed,

news/article.asp?id=702&nid=5 (noting "ever more frequent government practice of seeking a
blanket waiver of the privilege before the company has completed its internal probe"); Richard M.
Cooper, Privilege Under Fire, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 14, 2005, at 12 (observing that "prosecutors
increasingly demand waiver of the privilege as an element of organizational cooperation"); Zornow
& Krakaur, supra note 4, at 154 (noting that "federal prosecutors more and more frequently go so
far as to state that unless a company provides its privileged information to the government, the
company will be deemed not to have cooperated").
10. See infra note 14.
11. 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981). For a detailed discussion of Upjohn, see infra notes 160-85 and
accompanying text.
12. See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 4, at 149 (observing that "our criminal justice system
has already begun to suffer the loss of fully informed and vigorously adversarial legal representation
in exchange for prosecutorial expediency"); see also Del Giorno, supra note 5, at 22 (suggesting
that the Holder Memo, Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and related attorney conduct Rule
205 "greatly impact the attorney-client privilege and [a] lawyer's ability to effectively represent a
client").
13. See Ben-Veniste & Rubin, supra note 9, at 2 (observing that "the prospects of a company
waiver may... restrict the free flow of information between company employees and counsel");
Cooper, supra note 9, at 12 (noting that "[i]ncreasing employees' risks from cooperation may
reduce their willingness to answer questions at all or to answer truthfully and fully"); see also Del
Giorno, supra note 5, at 23 (observing that when an agreement to waive the privilege is "already in
place, the attorney must inform the witness that anything disclosed will be turned over to the
government"); Keneally, Threat, supra note 1, at 53 (noting that an "individual officer or employee
has the right not to speak to the government, and gains no protection when he or she speaks to the
corporation's attorney"); Van Fleet, supra note 6, at 8 (observing that the "policy [of] demanding
waiver.., will subject employees to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, obstruction of justice, or
discharge"). But see infra notes 202-11 and accompanying text (suggesting that level of trust and
candor is already low given the very nature of the corporate attorney-client privilege).
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and corporate counsel will understandably be more skeptical of the
accuracy or completeness of the information communicated to them; (2)
lawyers' internal investigations will become "paperless"1 4-- counsel will
refrain from taking notes or preparing memoranda in connection with
corporate representations to avoid future provision of a blueprint for
culpability to regulators and perhaps third parties;' 5 and (3) lawyers and
clients will cease to conduct internal investigations altogether, 6 in an
effort to evade the waiver issue entirely, which will invariably lead to a
decrease in corporate legal compliance.' 7 If these side effects of
compelled-voluntary waiver are in fact a reality, there is truly cause for
14. See American College of Trial Lawyers, supra note 4, at 322 (suggesting that in response
to DOJ pressure to waive, "counsel often anticipate at the outset of an investigation that 'the fruits
of the investigation stand a substantial chance of being delivered to the government,' and ... [a]s a
result, counsel may simply refrain from putting inculpatory information in written form"); BenVeniste & Rubin, supra note 9, at 2 (noting that "by creating disincentives to formalize thoughts or
convey impressions in writing, [the prospect of waiver] may produce undesirable changes in the
manner in which company lawyers ... perform their jobs"); Cooper, supra note 9, at 12 (observing
that "the costs added by a waiver to a finding of adverse information may temper the zeal to find it
and/or the completeness of its recordation (if and when found) in corporate counsel's notes and
memoranda"); Del Giorno, supra note 5, at 23 (suggesting that an attorney with knowledge that
information related to a representation will have to be disclosed to the government "may be more
cautious in creating written documentation of witness interviews and other investigations"); Savage
& Longo, supra note 2, at 5 (positing that the DOJ's waiver policy "may well result in less written
legal advice").
15. See COALITION SURVEY, supra note 9, at 14 (observing that because of the potential for
privilege waiver "I can no longer send memos that say: 'under no circumstances may you do this,'
or the like, for fear of reprisal [in the future]") (quoting one Survey respondent); Ben-Veniste &
Rubin, supra note 9, at 2 (maintaining that "companies which decide to waive the privilege in
criminal investigations must do so with the sober recognition that they also may be handing over
their internal documents to both the plaintiffs' bar and relevant federal and state regulatory
authorities"). Of those federal courts of appeal that have addressed the issue, the vast majority have
held that a corporate client may not "selectively waive" the attorney-client privilege or work
product doctrine as to the government without likewise waiving those protections as to other third
parties. See, e.g., Richard M. Strassberg & Sarah E. Walters, Is Selective Waiver of Privilege
Viable?, N.Y.L.J., July 7, 2003, at 7 (observing that the "prevailing view in most circuits is that
there can never be 'selective waiver' of the attorney-client privilege"); see also infra notes 35-36
and accompanying text. For a more detailed discussion of courts' treatment of this so-called
"selective waiver" issue, see infra Part V. In addition, it is widely recognized that one may not limit
waiver to the specific information disclosed-waiver will be broadened to encompass other
information related to the same subject matter. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
16. See Savage & Longo, supra note 2 (observing that the DOJ's waiver policy "serves to
discourage the acquisition of legal advice by corporations in the first place"); see also Cole, supra
note 3, at 486 (noting that "[flailing to afford the protection of the attorney-client privilege to
communications between business entities and their legal counsel would have a chilling effect on
internal investigations of corporate activities").
17. See COALITION SURVEY, supra note 9, at 14 (noting that "[t]o allow for this type of
[waiver] request will merely result in many corporations no longer including in-house counsel in
important decision-making processes which may in fact lead to even more wrongdoing") (quoting
one Survey respondent); see also infra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
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concern, as they are completely contrary to the expected benefits of this
corporate regulatory initiative.
The concept of encouraging greater cooperation with federal
investigations was a direct response to the unprecedented business
scandals that marred the image of corporate America at the turn of this
century. 8 The utopian expectation was that the prospect of favorable
regulatory or penal treatment would increase corporate self-regulation
and inspire greater overall corporate responsibility.' 9 In short, privilege
waiver, as a component of the larger "cooperation" calculus, was
expected to serve the utilitarian ideal of achieving the greatest good for
everyone-the government, corporate America, and most importantly,
the public.
Further, from a purely pragmatic standpoint, the DOJ policy (and
others like it) 20 was intended to promote efficiency and costs savings. 2 I
Rather than conducting a time-consuming and expensive investigation
that might lead to subsequent protracted litigation, compelled-voluntary
waiver would permit the agencies to cut directly to the chase, so to
speak. The DOJ undoubtedly believed that the best evidence of
corporate wrongdoing would consist of information arguably protected
by

the

attorney-client

privilege

and/or

work

product

doctrine,

information that they would have great difficulty obtaining in the
absence of a voluntary waiver, if they could obtain it at all.
Consequently, privilege waiver seemed to provide the most effective
18. See Buchanan, supra note 6, at 587 (observing that "the subject of organizational
accountability has been brought to the fore by a series of high-profile corporate scandals that have
shaken the public's confidence in the way that some of our largest companies conduct business").
Cf Van Fleet, supra note 6, at 8 (noting that "waiver undermines the policy of full and frank
internal disclosure of corporate wrongdoing embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform Act of 2002").
19. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 6, at 599 (observing that the amendments to the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines "placed great emphasis on the development of [good
corporate] culture in providing that '[tihese guidelines offer incentives to organizations to reduce
and ultimately eliminate criminal conduct by providing a structural foundation from which an
organization may self-police its own conduct through an effective compliance and ethics
program,"); John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming CorporationsThrough Threats of Federal Prosecution,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 311 (2004) (noting that "the premise that underlies [such] reform efforts
is that the federal government should transform corporations into 'good citizens').
20. See, e.g., Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement
Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, 2001 SEC LEXIS 2210 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2005) (delineating
criteria to be considered in evaluating a company's cooperation in connection with determination
regarding possible enforcement action).
21. See Cooper, supra note 9, at 12 (noting that "[w]aivers give prosecutors potentially useful
information, with minimal expenditure of prosecutorial resources"); see also In re Columbia/HCA,
293 F.3d 289, at 303 (6th Cir. 2002).
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avenue for quickly getting to the bottom of potential corporate
misconduct. All this, of course, presupposed that corporations and their
counsel would continue to operate consistent with a prototypical
attorney-client model, openly and candidly exchanging factual
information and legal advice. 22 If, however, the privilege waiver policies
have indeed chilled the corporate attorney-client relationship and
converted it into one of cautious distrust, as has been suggested, then
one might reasonably conclude that the DOJ, among others, ironically,
may have made the problem worse.23
Before the advent of compelled-voluntary waiver, there was
arguably a greater probability that counsel would receive all pertinent
information, both good and bad, and would accordingly have the
opportunity to steer the company in a lawful direction. If such candid
interchanges are no longer occurring, then it seems to follow that there is
an increased risk of corporate wrongdoing and the government's efforts
to ferret out such behavior may actually be undermined.2 4
Nevertheless, there is certainly room for doubt as to whether the
looming threat of compelled-voluntary waiver is affecting or will affect
the corporate attorney-client relationship in the fashion postulated.
Independent legal and economic incentives exist that may inspire
corporations to strive for legal compliance irrespective of the prospect of
privilege waiver.2 5 Furthermore, one can plausibly question how
22. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
23. See COALITION SURVEY, supra note 9, at 13-14 (maintaining that "current [waiver]
policies run a significant risk of chilling attorney client communications in the future which will
heighten, rather than reduce, compliance risks") (quoting one Survey respondent); American
College of Trial Lawyers, supra note 4, at 321 (observing that "[t]he chilling effect on corporate
self-scrutiny is obvious and there will be a serious adverse impact on the ability of corporations to
prevent the occurrence of future violations of law, and of counsel to conduct meaningful and
effective internal investigations").
24. See COALITION SURVEY, supra note 9, at 16 (observing that "[t]he heavy-handed
'requests' for waiver of the attorney/client privilege, with heavy handed penalties levied for failure
to 'cooperate,' will undermine the administration of justice in the long run") (quoting one Survey
respondent); Ben-Veniste & Rubin, supra note 9, at 3 (contending that the government's growing
propensity to seek privilege waiver at the beginning of an investigation "is fraught with substantial
risk for both the company and federal officials, as such a policy may in fact lead to the disclosure of
less information to the government rather than more"); Cooper, supra note 9, at 12 (observing that
"an aggressive prosecutorial tactic (demanding waivers) may lead to increased wrongdoing (by
eroding the effectiveness of corporate counsel)"); Van Fleet, supra note 6, at 8 (positing that a
"waiver policy that dissuades companies from coming forward will hurt government efforts to
prosecute criminal violations and reduce compensation to victims").
25. See, e.g., Brian E. Hamilton, Conflict, Disparity, andIndecision: The Unsettled Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege, 1997 ANN. SURV. Am. L. 629, 648 (1997) (maintaining that the
"possibility of facing punishment for regulatory violations should be the greatest deterrent to noncompliance"); see also Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870, 879 (Ariz. 1993) (rejecting
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forthcoming corporate executives and employees really are to their
counsel even with the guarantee of confidentiality provided by the
attorney-client privilege. Corporate constituents, for example, could
legitimately distrust the security provided to them by the corporate
privilege, given that it belongs to the corporation rather than to them
individually. 26 Hence, they may very well view internal investigations,
conducted in the absence of the prospect of compelled-voluntary waiver,
with a comparable degree of skepticism. In other words, it is possible
that before the concept of compelled-voluntary waiver even existed, the
corporate attorney-client dynamic may not have been all that different
from the flawed relationship that commentators currently attribute to the
DOJ policy. 27 As a result, widespread alarm over the perceived
governmental pressure to waive the privilege could, perhaps, be much
ado about nothing.
The obvious question that begs an answer is: Which position is
correct?-Is compelled-voluntary waiver eviscerating the corporate
attorney-client privilege and its concomitant benefits; or is the corporate
attorney-client privilege already a fundamentally flawed doctrine that
fails to promote the elemental touchstones of its forerunner, the
individual attorney-client privilege? As this Article reveals, the answer
to these questions is both "yes" and "no." There is some truth to each
position, but at the end of the day, accepting either does little to resolve
the controversy surrounding the DOJ and other privilege waiver policies.
Something more needs to be done to address adequately the problems

arguments that in the absence of a broad privilege, corporations would refrain from "policing their
own activities to ensure" legal compliance, and concluding instead that "[c]orporations comply with
the law because they wish to avoid liability"); infra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
26. See Hamilton, supra note 25, at 646 (observing that because a client corporation "can
waive the privilege at any time subsequent to an employee's communications [with counsel]....
the employee has no guarantee that the information he shares... will never be revealed in
litigation"); John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 509 (1982) (noting that "in those cases where the informationholder has a personal, as well as a corporate, legal interest in the information he possesses, the
possibility that the corporation might waive the attorney-client privilege, thereby rendering the
information discoverable, would create a powerful incentive either to refuse to communicate with
the attorney or to prevaricate"); Urofsky, supra note 7, at 643 (recounting then U.S. Attorney James
Comey's contention that "[e]xperienced attorneys routinely advise an employee that the interview is
covered only by the corporation's attorney client privilege and that the corporation could decide to
waive it").
27. See Urofsky, supra note 7, at 643 (noting then U.S. Attorney James Comey's observation
that "[tihere is no parade of horribles conjured up by the defense bar when, on their own initiative,
they waive the attorney client privilege or work product protection"); see also Hamilton, supra note
25, at 646-47 (observing that because employees' communications with counsel are never assured
of non-disclosure, they "will probably not be so forthcoming as was assumed in Upjohn").
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created by the oxymoronic concept of compelled-voluntary waiver, as
well as the inherent deficiencies of the corporate attorney-client
privilege.28
The debate thus far has focused on the privilege waiver policies
themselves and what needs to be done to alleviate their perceived effects
on the corporate attorney-client privilege, with the American Bar
Association ("ABA") being the most notable contributor to the
discussion. Specifically, on October 6, 2004, ABA President Robert
Grey established the Presidential Task Force on the Attorney-Client
Privilege,2 9 whose mission is:
[To] examine the purposes behind the privilege and its exceptions, the
circumstances in which competing objectives are currently being
asserted by governmental agencies and others to override the privilege,
and the extent to which the correct balance is being struck between
these competing objectives and the important policies underlying the
privilege.
On June 7, 2005, the Task Force issued a preliminary
recommendation that seemed somewhat rigid and unimaginative,
essentially proclaiming that to the extent governmental policies are
eroding the privilege, the ABA should oppose them. 31 The ABA House
of Delegates unanimously approved a slightly altered version of this

28. Although the government's waiver policies relate to both the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine, much of the debate has been cast in terms of the privilege alone. The
reasons for this are unclear, but it is likely either a reflection of the perceived greater importance of
the attorney-client privilege, or else is simply shorthand intended to cover the work product doctrine
as well. Whatever the rationale, for the sake of consistency, this Article will hereafter follow the
same nomenclatorial preference by centering the discussion primarily on the "corporate attorneyclient privilege."
29. See Press Release, ABA, ABA President Robert Grey Creates Task Force to Advocate for
Attorney-Client
Privilege
(Oct.
6,
2004),
available
at
http://www.abanetorg/
buslaw/attomeyclient/pressrelease.shtml. The Task Force is chaired by McKenna Long Aldridge,

partner and former ABA President R. William Ide III, and is comprised of thirteen members (in
addition to the chair) and three reporters, led by Professor Bruce A. Green of Fordham University
School of Law. See ABA, ABA Presidential Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege: Members,
http://www.abanet.orglbuslaw/attomeyclient/members.shtml (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).
30. ABA Presidential Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege: Mission Statement,
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/home.shtml (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).
31. See ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege: Recommendation 111,
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyelient/materials/hod/recommendation-adopted.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 21, 2006). The June 7, 2005 Report of the ABA Task Force in connection with its
Recommendation is available at http://www.abanet.orgibuslaw/attorneyclient/materialsIhod/
report.pdf.
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recommendation in August 2005, which did little more32 than strengthen
the resoluteness of the Task Force's suggested position.
In apparent response to the ABA's pronouncement, as well as the
overall concern regarding compelled-voluntary waiver, on October 21,
2005, the DOJ formally ordered what amounts to greater administrative
oversight and regulation of waiver requests by all United States
Attorneys.3 3 In particular, the DOJ directive, embodied in a
memorandum authored by Acting Deputy Attorney General Robert D.
McCallum, Jr., provides, in pertinent part, that:
To ensure that federal prosecutors exercise appropriate prosecutorial
discretion under the principles of the Thompson Memorandum, some
United States Attorneys have established review processes for waiver
requests that require federal prosecutors to obtain approval from the
United States Attorney or other supervisor before seeking a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege or work product protection. Consistent
a written waiver
with this best practice, you are directed to establish
34
review process for your district or component.
In addition to the ABA and DOJ responses, other contributors to
the debate have proposed legislative or judicial recognition of "selective
waiver" of the corporate attorney-client privilege as a possible
compromise. 35 Under this proposal, a corporation would be permitted to
32. See Joan C. Rogers, Delegates Unanimously Support Resolution Opposing Government
Coercion on Privileges, 21 Laws. Man. on Prof Conduct (ABA/BNA) 414, 414 (Aug. 10, 2005)

(observing that the version ratified by the House of Delegates is "more strongly worded than the
task force's recommendation").
33. See Joan C. Rogers, DOJ Instructs U.S. Attorneys to Formulate Written Process for
Privilege Waiver Requests, 21 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA) 564 (Nov. 2, 2005).
34. Id. Although it is somewhat encouraging to compelled-voluntary waiver critics that the
DOJ is at least trying to address their concerns, many appear to believe that the McCallum Memo
does not represent a very meaningful gesture. See id. (observing that some lawyers were of the
opinion "that the new policy is a positive step but falls short of the changes needed to prevent
federal prosecutors from routinely and inappropriately demanding privilege waivers"); Stephen W.
Grafman & Jeffrey L. Bornstein, New Memo Won't Help, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 2005, at 31
(contending that "[t]he new policy, if it can be called that, will have little, if any, effect in
eliminating the now virtually routine request for waivers of attorney-client and attorney workproduct privilege"); see also Rogers, supra note 33, at 565 (noting one prominent New York
defense attorney's opinion that the new policy was "a fairly superficial gesture").
35. See, e.g., David M. Brodsky & Jeff G. Hammel, What Price Cooperation? Reducing the
Costs of Waiving Privilege During SEC Investigations, 6 WALL ST. LAW., Dec. 2002, at 1, 3-4
(recommending "legislatively limiting the scope of the waiver in connection with an SEC
investigation so that the information obtained through the waiver may be used solely by the
Enforcement Staff... not in civil contexts outside the investigation"); Buchanan, supra note 6, at
606 (observing that "[s]ome critics have requested legislative enactment or judicial creation of a
privilege to cover voluntary disclosures of attorney-client privileged and work product information
to the government"); see also Ashok M. Pinto, Cooperation and Self-Interest are Strange
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waive the privilege as to the government in isolation without effecting a
broader, general waiver. 36 Put simply, the waiver would be limited only

to the material disclosed and the party to whom disclosure was made.
Though well-intended and understandable, neither the ABA's rigid
privilege stance, the DOJ's mandate for greater scrutiny of waiver
requests, nor the concept of selective waiver is likely to move the
compelled-voluntary waiver discussion towards a meaningful resolution.
This stems from their singular concentration on the waiver issue in the
context of maintaining the corporate attorney-client privilege in its
present form. Such a limited approach overlooks the potential for
compromise that could result from steering the discussion towards
reconsideration of the corporate attorney-client privilege itself.
Specifically, it may be possible to narrow the scope of the corporate
attorney-client privilege so as to protect the sort of information that the
privilege was originally designed to cover, as well as that which
corporations desire most to be kept confidential, such as legal advice
from counsel or incriminating communications from senior management
to corporate counsel. This would likely render "non-privileged" a great
deal of what the government currently seeks to obtain via waiver. Hence,
corporations subject to a DOJ investigation would be able to disclose
such information voluntarily without ever having to confront the
privilege waiver issue. The purpose of this Article is to make the case for
this nuanced approach to resolving the compelled-voluntary waiver
paradox.
After discussing some foundational background principles
regarding the individual and corporate attorney-client privileges in Parts
II and III, Part IV provides a detailed examination of the compelledvoluntary waiver issue and its alleged effects on the corporate attorneyclient relationship. The Article continues in Part V with a discussion and
assessment of the selective waiver doctrine, which appears to be the
most popular remedial proposal at present. Part VI then presents support
for refocusing the waiver debate on reconsideration of the privilege
itself, and concludes with a proposal for the establishment of a uniform
corporate attorney-client privilege, the scope of which should be

Bedfellows: Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege Through Production of Privileged
Documents in a Government Investigation, 106 W. VA. L. REv. 359 (2004).
36. See Cooper, supra note 9, at 12 (observing that under existing circumstances, "waiver
may not be limited to the prosecutors, but may extend to regulatory bodies, plaintiffs' lawyers and
others ... [, and] may be held to cover the disclosure's subject matter . . . not merely the particular
information disclosed").
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modeled after the once popular "control group" test, albeit in a slightly
revised form.
While some may disagree with this Article's specific proposal, the
underlying concept of centering the privilege waiver dialogue around
reconsideration of the corporate attorney-client privilege seems worthy
of reflection. At a minimum, it provides a more constructive beginning
to the discussion and likely presents a more realistic opportunity for
reaching an acceptable compromise that will preserve the sanctity of the
privilege in its most fundamental form, while reasonably
accommodating the government's investigatory objectives.
II.

THE INDIVIDUAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

A.

Scope of the Privilege

The attorney-client privilege is evidentiary in nature, protecting
against the compelled disclosure by the attorney or client of
communications between them that satisfy the requisite elements.37 The
precise formulation of the individual attorney-client privilege may vary
somewhat between jurisdictions, but the general requirements are
essentially the same.3 8 In order for information to be protected from
compelled disclosure, it must constitute "(1) a communication (2) made
between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for
the purpose of
39
client."
the
for
assistance
legal
providing
or
obtaining
The privilege is actually somewhat broader than the elements might
facially suggest. First, a "communication" can be oral, written or even

37. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.1.1 (1986) (observing that the
privilege is a "rule of evidence that precludes another party in litigation from asking either client or
lawyer what either has exchanged in confidence").
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 5, tit. A, introductory
note (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (observing that "[e]very American jurisdiction provideseither by statute, evidence code, or common law-that generally neither a client nor the client's
lawyer may be required to testify or otherwise to provide evidence that reveals the content of
confidential communications between client and lawyer in the course of seeking or rendering legal
advice or other legal assistance"); WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.3.1 (noting that the attomey-client
privilege is recognized in every jurisdiction within the United States and that "[flormulations and
model statements of it abound").
39. RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 68 & reporter's note (noting that the Restatement's
definition of the attomey-client privilege "differs only slightly from other general formulations put
forward in recent decades"); FED. R. EvID. 501 (providing that "in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or political subdivision thereof shall be
determined in accordance with State law").
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non-verbal and still qualify for protection.4 ° In addition, the requirement
that the protected communication be between "privileged persons"
encompasses not just the attorney and client or prospective client, but
also the authorized agents of either. 41 For example, associates or other
employees within a lawyer's firm who are necessary to carry out a
representation would be considered "privileged persons" for purposes of
the attorney-client privilege.42
A critical limiting factor on these seemingly liberal components of
the privilege, however, is that it only protects "communications"
themselves, not underlying facts.4 3 The easiest way to comprehend this
is to consider it in the context of a written communication prepared for
and transmitted to a lawyer by a client for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice. The written document itself would most likely be covered by the
attorney-client privilege, but the information contained therein would
not. Barring some other valid objection, third parties would be able to
gain access to that information through some form of court-sanctioned
compulsion, such as a deposition, discovery request or subpoena.
In addition, the scope of the individual attorney-client privilege is
further circumscribed by the strict requirements that the communication
be for the purpose of acquiring or rendering legal advice, and be
conveyed and maintained in confidence. Communications will not
qualify for protection if made for some purpose other than obtaining
legal assistance from a lawyer,4 4 or if made in the presence of or
40. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 69 cmts. b, e; WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.3.5.
41. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 70 (defining "privileged persons" to include "the
client (including a prospective client), the client's lawyer, agents of either who facilitate
communications between them, and agents of the lawyer who facilitate the representation").
42. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 70 cmt. g (noting that lawyers "may disclose
privileged communications to other office lawyers and with appropriate nonlawyer staffsecretaries, file clerks, computer operators, investigators, office managers, paralegal assistants,
telecommunications personnel, and similar law-office assistants"); WOLFRAM, supra note 37,
§ 6.3.8 (recognizing that "a lawyer may permissibly discuss confidential information about a client
with partners and associates in the lawyer's own firm"). Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6 cmt. 5 (2004) (observing that "[l]awyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice,
disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that
particular information be confined to specified lawyers").
43. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (indicating that "[t]he
privilege only protects disclosure of communications; ... not ... disclosure of the underlying facts
by those who communicated with the attorney"); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 69 cmt. d
(observing that the "privilege protects only the content of the communication between privileged
persons, not the knowledge of privileged persons about facts themselves"); WOLFRAM, supra note
37, § 6.3.5 (noting that the privilege protects "the specific content of the communication to the
lawyer, not the facts themselves").
44. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 72 cmt. b (noting that the client or prospective client
"must have consulted the lawyer to obtain legal counseling or advice, document preparation,
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subsequently disclosed to third parties (knowingly or inadvertently).45
Moreover, because the attorney-client privilege necessarily hinders the
quest for the truth,46 which at least theoretically defines the American
legal system, it is well established that the privilege is to be strictly
construed.4 7
The narrowness of the attorney-client privilege is complemented by
the recognition of several exceptions. The best-known and most
frequently recognized is the crime-fraud exception. 48 Under this
exception, the privilege is nullified when the client seeks legal advice or
assistance "for the purpose of,.... in the furtherance of' or "in connection
with" a future or on-going crime or fraud.49 In essence, the "purpose"
element of the privilege is corrupted by the client's nefarious intent. 50 As
Justice Benjamin Cardozo once aptly stated: "The privilege takes flight
litigation services, or any other assistance customarily performed by lawyers in their professional
capacity").
45. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 71 & cmt. a (observing that "[e]ven if the initial
communication is in confidence and otherwise qualifies for protection as a privileged
communication, its privileged status may be lost by subsequent revelation of the communication").
46. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 68 cmt. c (noting that the "law accepts the risks of
factual error and injustice in individual cases in deference to the values that the privilege
vindicates"); WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.1.4 (observing that the privilege's guarantee of
confidentiality "is purchased only at the price of excluding from trials evidence from lawyers and
clients about their conversations-a detraction from the search for truth that is 'plain and
concrete'); Sexton, supra note 26, at 446 (suggesting that "even its staunchest proponents concede
that, whenever the privilege is invoked, otherwise relevant and admissible evidence may be
suppressed").
47. See Sexton, supra note 26, at 446 (maintaining that because of the "tension... between
the secrecy required to effectuate the privilege and the openness demanded by the factfinding
process ... [,] it has been concluded broadly that the contours of the privilege should 'be strictly
confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle') (quoting 8
J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)); EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN,

THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 12-14 (4th ed. 2001);
WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.3.4. But see EPSTEIN, supra, at 14 (observing that even though
"courts frequently say the privilege is to be narrowly or strictly construed, their decisions do not
always bear out this dictum").
48. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 82.
49. There are various specific formulations of the scope of the crime-fraud exception. The
Restatement provides that the exception applies when a client "consults a lawyer for the purpose,
later accomplished, of obtaining assistance to engage in a crime or fraud or aiding a third person to
do so, or... regardless of the client's purpose at the time of consultation, uses the lawyer's advice
or other services to engage in or assist a crime or fraud." RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 82. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on the other hand, utilizes a slightly different
definition, recognizing that "the privilege does not apply where legal representation was secured in
furtherance of intended, or present, continuing illegality." United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548
F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1977).
50. It is important to note that the client 's intent is the critical triggering factor for the crimefraud exception-"the exception applies even if a lawyer is unaware of the client's intended crime
or fraud." WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.4.10.
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if the relation is abused. A client who consults an attorney for advice that
will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the
law.'
Another well known exception is the so-called "self defense"
exception, under which a lawyer is permitted to disclose and utilize
otherwise privileged information in order to defend himself or herself
against a charge of wrongdoing by the client or some third party.52 In
addition, under this exception, a lawyer is likewise allowed to use
privileged communications for the purpose of establishing a claim
against a client or former client, typically for the recovery of attorney's
fees.5 3 In these instances, one could also view the exception as somewhat
of a waiver or negation of the element of confidentiality, insofar as the
attorney's legal assistance itself has been put at issue in a separate
proceeding.5 4
Although similar to an exception to the attorney-client privilege,
waiver is usually thought of as a separate concept. As alluded to earlier,
it is basically a relinquishment of the "confidential" component of the
privilege, and it can be accomplished through an inadvertent disclosure
or through a conscious voluntary revelation. 55 The latter form is the
focus of this Article and will be explored in much greater detail in
subsequent sections. For present purposes, the significance of waiver
relates to the narrowing effect that it has upon the breadth of the
attorney-client privilege. Furthermore, when courts determine that
waiver has occurred, it will most likely be extended beyond the

51.

GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 303 (4th ed.

2005) (quoting Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note
38, § 82 cmt. b (observing that the crime-fraud exception "can be founded on the additional moral
ground that the client's wrongful intent forfeits the protection").
52. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 83 (providing that the "privilege does not apply to a
communication that is relevant and reasonably necessary for a lawyer to employ in a
proceeding ... to defend the lawyer or the lawyer's associate or agent against a charge by any
person that the lawyer, associate, or agent acted wrongfully during the course of representing a
client").
53. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 83 (permitting a lawyer to disclose, to the extent
relevant and reasonably necessary, otherwise privileged communications in order "to resolve a
dispute with a client concerning compensation or reimbursement that the lawyer reasonably claims
the client owes").
54.

Cf RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 80.

55. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 79 (providing that the "privilege is waived if the
client, the client's lawyer, or another authorized agent of the client voluntarily discloses the
communication in a non-privileged communication").
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particular communication in question to other information that relates to
the same subject matter,56 as well as to any interested third party.5 7
The overt constricting of the scope and applicability of the attorneyclient privilege might lead one reasonably to conclude that the alleged
side effects of the DOJ's waiver efforts might actually be present even in
the absence of such governmental pressure. Nevertheless, the reality
appears to be that the privilege's tight constraints are substantially
counter-balanced by its sacrosanct aura 58 and the related pragmatic
justifications that reputedly support it. The next section will examine the
historical foundation and development of the privilege in an effort to
illuminate both the basis and the propriety of its revered standing in our
legal hierarchy.
B.

Evolution of the Privilege-OriginsandJustifications

The principal rationale for the attorney-client privilege is strongly
rooted in the belief that it encourages open and candid communication
between attorney and client, and thereby facilitates the rendition of

56. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 79 cmt. f (observing that partial disclosure of
privileged information typically results in the general waiver of the privilege with regard to
communications related to the same subject matter, whether disclosed during the course of a trial or
in the context of pretrial discovery). This type of waiver is typically referred to as "subject matter"
waiver and it is the common by-product of the disclosure of otherwise privileged communications,
although under certain circumstances, one may be able to effect what has been called a "partial"
waiver. Specifically, if the disclosure of privileged information is made in a non-litigation context
and not for the purpose of obtaining some potential intrajudicial benefit, then courts are willing to
limit the scope of the waiver only to the material actually disclosed. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra
note 38, § 79 cmt. f & reporter's note (discussing In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987),
among other cases, as an example of a situation in which public disclosure of privileged information
outside of litigation did not result in subject matter waiver).
57. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. For a thorough discussion of the concept of
"selective waiver," which allows one to limit the extent of a waiver to a particular party, see infra
Part V.
58. The perceived sanctity of the attorney-client privilege is reinforced by the broader ethical
duty of confidentiality, which basically prohibits a lawyer from disclosing or using, without client
consent, "information relating to the representation of a client." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2004) (emphasis added); see also id. R. 1.8(b), 1.9(c)(1) (discussing
prohibitions regarding "use" of confidential information to a client's and former client's
disadvantage, respectively). This broader protection, provided to information that qualifies as
confidential, is often conflated with the attorney-client privilege by both attorneys and their clients,
which no doubt contributes to the corporate outrage over compelled-voluntary waiver. See, e.g.,
Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 69, 72, 75
(observing that "even courts addressing client secrecy issues conflate the principles of privilege and
confidentiality" and that similar confusion amongst lawyers and clients exists). In other words, the
misconception of the scope of the privilege greatly expands the quantity of information that
corporations and their counsel believe that the government is improperly co-opting.
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effective legal services. 59 Although this justification is uniformly
acknowledged within the American legal system as the cornerstone for
60
the creation and continued recognition of the attorney-client privilege,
the actual origin and evolution of the privilege call into question the
definitive nature of this contemporary assessment.61
As with many other aspects of our law, the genesis of the American
version of the attorney-client privilege can be traced to England.62 The
initial motivation for recognition of the privilege by English courts was
apparently a by-product of British etiquette. Specifically, courts of
England were reluctant "to require lawyers to breach the code of a
gentleman by being compelled to reveal in court what they had been told
by clients. ,,63 As such, ulk
unlike the modem American edition, under which
the privilege belongs to the client, the privilege in England originally
59. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 68 cmt. c (noting that the "rationale for the privilege
is that confidentiality enhances the value of client-lawyer communications and hence the efficacy of
legal services"); Vincent S. Walkowiak, An Overview of the Attorney-Client Privilege When the
Client is a Corporation, in ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION: PROTECTING AND

DEFENDING CONFIDENTIALITY 1, 1 (Vincent S. Walkowiak ed., 2004) [hereinafter PROTECTING
AND DEFENDING] (indicating that the "purpose of the attorney-client privilege, established long ago,
is to promote the free flow of information between attorneys and their clients while removing the
fear that the details ... will be revealed to outsiders," which ultimately enables the attorney to
"render accurate advice"); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 47, at 4 (observing that "[w]ith fear of
disclosure, all facts will not be freely revealed and legal advice cannot be effectively given");
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L.
REV. 1061, 1061 (1978) (observing that "the advocate can adequately prepare a case only if the
client is free to disclose everything, bad as well as good... [and] the legal counselor can properly
advise the client what to do only if the client is free to make full disclosure").
60. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 161 (1993) [hereinafter Thornburg,
Sanctifying] (observing that encouragement of full communication between attorney and client has
been the "theory on which lawyers, judges, and commentators primarily rely in justifying the
existence of the corporate attorney-client privilege").
61. See, e.g., Hazard, Jr., supra note 59, at 1070 (contending that the historical foundations of
the attorney-client privilege were less than firm and its development "slow and halting until after
1800").
62. But see Thornburg, Sanctifying, supra note 60, at 160 (observing that the "roots of the
attorney-client privilege can be traced to a Roman law concept of loyalty: advocates were
incompetent to testify against their clients because such testimony would involve an immoral breach
of duty, and such an immoral person was irrebuttably presumed to be unworthy of belief').
63. RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 68 cmt. c; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.1.2
(noting the early rationale for the privilege as being related to the "'gentleman's honor' notion that
lawyers should not be embarrassed by being called upon to reveal unnice things about clients");
Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (observing that the
attorney-client privilege was originally "based on 'the oath and the honor of the attorney,' who
needed to be spared from the unseemly task of having to testify in court"); see also Thornburg,
Sanctifying, supra note 60, at 160 (noting that "until the mid-1700's English courts granted a
privilege to 'gentlemen' [not just lawyers] from testifying if such testimony would violate a promise
of secrecy").
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belonged to the lawyer. 64 Furthermore, under English law until the midnineteenth century, parties in cases were not considered competent to
testify, either on their own behalf or as a part of the opposition's
presentation. 65 Thus, the prohibition against an attorney testifying as to
communications with a client also served to prevent parties from
effecting an end-run around their disqualification as witnesses. 66 In other
words, if a client could not testify, it only made sense that his or her
attorney would be precluded from doing so with regard to the subject of
the representation.67
The testimonial limitations with regard to parties, however, may
have paralleled the attorney-client privilege only to the extent that an
adversary would not otherwise be able to obtain the restricted
information. In particular, in English courts of law, parties were not
permitted to conduct discovery. Hence, the prohibition against allowing
parties to testify in court effectively precluded litigants from in any way
obtaining information from an adversary directly. Therefore, it made
sense to prevent the indirect acquisition of that same information from
a
68
party's attorney through recognition of the attorney-client privilege.
On the contrary, in courts of equity, in which discovery was
permitted, this coherent justification for the privilege seemed more
tenuous.6 9 Specifically, at equity, even though the parties were still not
permitted to testify in court, they could obtain the "testimonial
information" that they sought from the opposing party directly through
discovery. 70 And, if the adversary could get at the information in this

64. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 68 cmt. c; see also Fischel, supra note 63, at 3
(noting that given the initial rationale for the privilege, it was viewed as belonging to the lawyer,
rather than the client); Hazard, Jr., supra note 59, at 1070 (observing that "some of the early cases
express the idea that the privilege was that of the lawyer").
65. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 68 cmt. c; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.1.2
(discussing parties' lack of competence to testify in their own behalves, as well as their ability to
assert a "privilege of not being called to testify in behalf of an adversary (on the ground that it might
be self-incriminatory or expose the witness to disgrace)").
66. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 68 cmt. c; see also Hazard, Jr., supra note 59, at
1083 (observing that one of the original reasons for the privilege was to prevent "obtaining a party's
testimony indirectly when it could not be adduced directly").
67. See WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.1.2 (observing that in light of the testimonial
restrictions on parties at this time, "it would have been anomalous to require a party's lawyer to
testify to damaging information"); see also Fischel, supra note 63, at 4 (noting that attorneys were
viewed as necessary for the efficient operation of the court system in England, and "[t]o encourage
[their] employment ... it became indispensable to extend to them the immunity enjoyed by the
party" (emphasis omitted) (quoting Whiting v. Barney, 30 N.Y. 330, 332-33 (1864)).
68. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
69. See Hazard, Jr., supra note 59, at 1083.
70. See id.
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fashion, there would have been considerably less of a need for the
protection of the attorney-client privilege7 to safeguard such information
in the possession of the client's attorney. 1
The roots of this notion can be gleaned from Preston v. Carr,72 a
case in which letters written by a defendant to his solicitors conveying
factual information concerning legal advice sought had to be produced
over the defendant's objection. 73 Notwithstanding the absence of
privilege protection for the letters themselves, the court found that the
advice ultimately provided by the barrister (counsel) in response did not
have to be disclosed.74 Essentially, the court held that "when a
communication to an attorney can be proved by some means other than
the attorney's own testimony, the privilege does not apply. 7 5
At first blush, this broad proposition sounds like a rather
extraordinary potential limitation on the scope of the privilege, but upon
further examination, it does not appear to have been nearly so dramatic
in the context of this case. According to Professor Geoffrey Hazard, the
court's decision in Preston only precluded a client from maintaining the
privilege to avoid "yielding his own knowledge about the matters in
controversy simply because he [had] related them to his solicitor., 76 In
other words, the letters prepared by the defendant for the purpose of
conveying factual information to his solicitors could no more be
protected from discovery than could the factual information contained
within the defendant's head, upon which the letters were based. As such,
Preston seemingly represents but a slight variation on the contemporary
notion that the privilege only protects communicationsbetween attorney
and client, not the underlying facts.7 7 The critical distinction, though, is

71. See id.
72. Preston v. Carr, (1826) 148 Eng. Rep. 634, 635 (Exch. Div.).
73. See Hazard, Jr., supra note 59, at 1082 (discussing Preston v. Carr, (1826) 148 Eng. Rep.
634, 635 (Exch. Div.)).
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Interestingly, Professor Hazard suggested that a client could avoid the disclosure
predicament involved in Preston by simply communicating with his or her counsel orally, rather
than in writing. See id at 1083 n.97. This communication would be protected by the privilege, and
the client could convey whatever he or she desired in a deposition. See id As Professor Hazard duly
notes, however, this could raise another disclosure quandary to the extent that the client's testimony
constitutes perjury, requiring counsel to rectify the fraud upon the court. See id
The irony of Professor Hazard's observations is that they portend one of the alleged sideeffects of compelled-voluntary waiver in the context of the corporate attorney-client privilege-i.e.,
that counsel and clients will cease to put information related to internal investigations in writing.
See supranotes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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that under today's version of the privilege, the letters would themselves
qualify as "communications. 78
It also seems possible to view Preston as a forerunner to the
Supreme Court's decision in Fisher v. United States.79 There the Court
held that pre-existing documents, turned over to counsel for the purpose
of obtaining legal advice, would not be protected by the attorney-client
privilege, unless they would have been otherwise protected from
disclosure while in the possession of the client-e.g., by the client's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 80 In Preston, on
the other hand, the court's unwillingness to protect the letters was a
function of its reluctance to acknowledge that the defendant had a
privilege to assert in his own right.8 ' In other words, by turning over
information that would have been discoverable while in his possession,
the defendant
could not somehow render it privileged in a ubiquitous
2
8

sense.

As the privilege evolved in England, there were certainly other
doctrinal developments that bore resemblance to significant aspects of
the modern American analog. This progression, however, at times may
have been more a function of what some judges believed the privilege
should embody, 3 rather than a studied expansion of the privilege based
78. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
79. 425 U.S. 391 (1975).
80. See id.at 402; see also Hazard, Jr., supra note 59, at 1082 (discussing the court's
reasoning in Preston that "since defendant himself would have to disgorge his knowledge on
deposition, and since he would have to produce preexisting memoranda of events such as a diary or
correspondence with others, it is no ground for objection that his memoranda of the events were sent
to counsel").
81. In particular, the Chief Baron stated that: "I cannot accede to the proposition which has
been contended for, that the privilege of an attorney is the privilege of the client, to the extent that
the client himself may avail himself of that privilege, to avoid discovering communications which
have passed between him and his solicitor." Preston v. Carr, (1826) 148 Eng. Rep. 634, 635 (Exch.
Div.).
82.

Though factually distinguishable, it is the author's opinion that the analytical affinity

between Preston and Fisher suggests a very important link between the past and the present
conceptions of the attorney-client privilege that must be kept in mind when rethinking the scope of
the corporate privilege. For a deeper exploration of the concept of reconstituting the corporate
privilege so as to cover only information that would not have been communicated in the absence of
the privilege, see infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text; see also Sexton, supra note 26, at 480
(observing that "a perfectly defined corporate privilege would protect 'only those disclosuresnecessary to obtain informed legal advice-which might not have been made absent the privilege"'
(quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1975)).
83. See Hazard, Jr., supra note 59, at 1083 (observing that the relatively definite and limited
attorney-client privilege of the early 1800s "received a redefinition in rhetoric that greatly enlarged
its potential scope" after 1830); see also id.at 1083-85 (discussing two decisions by Lord
Broughman in which he expanded the scope of the privilege beyond any reasonable recognition,
basically encompassing just about any communication between attorney and client).
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upon its original underpinnings. 4 Nevertheless, there were others who
sought to remain true to the decidedly narrow parameters of the
attorney-client privilege that had previously been established. In
particular, judges adhered to the traditional doctrinal constraint that a
communication had to have some relation to pending or prospective
litigation in order to be protected, 85 as well as to the concept that the
privilege is inapplicable when the element of "confidence" is lacking or
when legal assistance is sought for an unlawful purpose.8 6
Although its somewhat disjointed development undoubtedly posed
interpretative problems for the English courts, probably the greatest
difficulty was created by the removal of the prohibition against parties
testifying.87 This effectively eliminated one of the original bases for the
privilege, and thus starkly presented for the first time to the courts of
England the conflict between the search for the truth and the protection
of attorney-client confidences. 88 Rather than reconsidering the scope or
efficacy of the privilege, however, the courts apparently labored to
address the dilemma within the traditional confines of the doctrine,
attempting to reconcile conflicting precedents. 89
Unlike in England, the predicament of furthering the quest for the
truth while at the same time preserving the confidential nature of
attorney-client communications is one that was presented to the courts of
the United States from the very beginning. This could explain, at least in
part, the general willingness of American courts initially to embrace the
narrow conception of the privilege that had defined the British doctrine.
Most notably, early cases in the United States reflected fidelity to the
long-established limitation that the privilege only applied to
communications that related to existing or potential litigation.9" Yet, at
some point, as with the doctrinal evolution in England, the privilege in
America expanded beyond this very narrow focus, fostering the air of
84. See id. at 1085 (observing the complete disconnection between the privilege as interpreted
by Lord Broughman and "its point of origin"-the client's incompetency to testify in court).
85. See id. at 1079 (interpreting the formulation of the attorney-client privilege in Annesley v.
Anglesea, 17 How. St. Trials 1139 (1743) as limiting the protection to "matters disclosed in
connection with pending or proposed litigation, but only if it [was] germane to the attorney's
function in the litigation"); see also id. at 1081, 1085-86 (discussing later cases in which it was
emphasized that the privilege to communications related to both pending and prospective litigation).
86. See id. at 1085-87.
87. See id. at 1086.
88. See id.
89. See id. (observing that rather than acknowledging and addressing the contradiction
between the search for the truth and the protection of confidences, the English courts sought to
reconcile the conflicting precedents).
90. See id. at 1090-91.
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sacredness that now envelopes .it, 91 as well as misconceptions with
regard to the actual scope of its protection.92 Notwithstanding this, courts
and commentators have persisted in clinging to the mantra that the
privilege be strictly construed.
The substance of this section draws significantly from Professor
Hazard's well-known law review article on the history of the attorneyclient privilege. 93 His ultimate assessment provides a poignant message
that seems equally applicable to the current controversy and confusion
that surrounds the privilege in the United States: "Taken as a whole, the
of privilege or
historical record is not authority for a broadly stated rule 94
confidence. It is, rather, an invitation for reconsideration."
C.

ConstitutionalPrinciplesSupporting Recognition
of the IndividualPrivilege

Apart from the doctrinal development and underpinnings of the
individual attorney-client privilege, it is also important to examine some
constitutional principles that the privilege serves to reinforce, namely the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Even though these constitutional
guarantees played no role in the recognition of the privilege in the
United States, 95 a close relationship undeniably exists.
1. The Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part that no person
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... , 96 By logical extension, this guarantee would be of little
benefit if the accused's communications to his or her advocate could be
compelled by the government. As with the early British version of the
privilege, which was grounded on the incompetence of parties to
testify, 97 permitting the acquisition of information from a criminal
defendant's counsel when that information could not be obtained from
him or her directly would seriously weaken the protection accorded by
91. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 58, at 75 (observing the confusion that exists with regard
to the distinction between the ethical duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege
amongst judges, lawyers and clients).
93. See Hazard, Jr., supra note 59.
94. Id. at 1070.
95. See WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.2.1 (observing that the "attorney-client privilege

developed historically without any relationship to constitutional rights").
96. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
97. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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the Fifth Amendment.9 8 As such, to preserve the efficacy of the privilege
against self-incrimination, it only makes sense that information protected
by the Fifth Amendment must not lose its protection when
communicated
by a client to counsel for the purpose of obtaining legal
99
advice.
It is not the Fifth Amendment, however, that safeguards this
information once conveyed to counsel. The privilege against selfincrimination is a personal right, possessed only by the individual
asserting it.' 00 Compelling a criminal defense lawyer to disclose
information incriminating to a client would not be "self-incriminating,"
nor would it require the client to be a witness against himself, as the
client is not personally compelled to do anything.' 0' Given this
constitutional reality, it's obvious that the necessary protection must
come from some other source,
and that is where the attorney-client
02
privilege comes into play.'
The privilege protects all communications between attorney and
client, made in confidence, for the purpose of obtaining or rendering
legal advice.' 0 3 As a result, any information, no matter how
incriminating, that is communicated to counsel under the requisite
circumstances is entitled to the privilege's protection, provided that no
exceptions apply. It is important to note that the Supreme Court's
decision in Fisher was limited to the scenario of a client turning over
pre-existing documents to counsel for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice. Therefore, the Court had to address the additional difficult
question of whether these materials would be protected by the Fifth
Amendment while in the hands of the client. This concern is not
implicated when the communication of incriminating information is oral
or, if written, is prepared for the express purpose of conveying such

98.

Cf supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.

99. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 405 (1975) (finding that if pre-existing tax
documents transferred to counsel for the purpose of obtaining legal advice were "unobtainable by

summons from the client, [they were also] unobtainable by summons directed to the attorney by
reason of the attorney-client privilege").
100. See id at 397 (noting that the "Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of

'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege").
101.

See

id.

(holding

that

"[tihe

taxpayer's

[Fifth

Amendment]

privilege... is not

violated.., because enforcement against a taxpayer's lawyer would not 'compel' the taxpayer to do
anything-and certainly would not compel him to be a 'witness' against himself").
102. See id. at 401 (holding that "[i]nsofar as private information not obtained through
compelled self-incriminating testimony is legally protected, its protection stems from other
sources.., such as the attorney-client privilege").
103.

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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information to counsel in connection with the representation. 0 4 There
would likely be no question as to the applicability of the Fifth
Amendment under these circumstances, and the attorney-client privilege,
in this context, undergirds the Fifth Amendment by preventing the
circumvention of its protections. 0 5
Furthermore, in the absence of the sanctuary that the privilege
provides, it seems likely that a criminal defendant would refrain from
disclosing to counsel incriminating facts that might be critical to
preparing an adequate defense.10 6 If this occurs, it follows that the
effectiveness of the representation could be undermined, thus
implicating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
2. The Sixth Amendment
Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is entitled to the
07
effective assistance of counsel in connection with his or her defense.'
While there are certainly aspects of effectiveness that are solely a
function of an attorney's competency and diligence, even the most
competent and diligent attorney arguably can be rendered ineffective if
he or she is operating with incorrect or incomplete factual information.
This is recognizably where the Sixth Amendment and the attorney-client
privilege intersect.
As already discussed, the primary rationale for the privilege is to
encourage complete and candid communication between lawyer and
client. 10 8 Beneath this over-arching purpose, however, are three
commonly articulated assumptions that relate directly to the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. The first assumption is that it is to an
individual's benefit to have the assistance of counsel when confronting
legal difficulties, particularly criminal ones. 10 9 Second, it has been

104.

For further discussion of Fisher and its potential contribution to the debate regarding

compelled-voluntary waiver, see infra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
105. Cf supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
106.

See Walkowiak, supra note 59, at I (observing that "[i]t is frequently the most harmful

information that the attorney needs most in order to provide accurate counsel to a client"). But see
infra note I1l and accompanying text (characterizing as "somewhat controversial" the assumption

that a client would necessarily withhold embarrassing information in the absence of the privilege).
107. The language of the Sixth Amendment actually only provides for the "[a]ssistance of
counsel," but that right has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to include an "effective[ness]"
guarantee as well. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
686 (1984).
108. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
109. See WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.1.3; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 68 cmt. c

(observing that "vindicating rights and complying with obligations under the law and under modern
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assumed that an attorney's advice and counsel "must be based upon a
firm grasp of the facts of the situation and information about the client's
objectives gained from client disclosures."'110 The third assumption is a
logical, though somewhat controversial, corollary to the first two, that
being, counsel will not be able to obtain the necessary disclosures in the
absence of an assurance of confidentiality.11 In particular, the belief is
that it's critical for an individual criminal defendant to be able to tell his
or her lawyer everything in order for truly effective representation to be
provided. Without a durable attomey-client privilege, so the argument
goes, a client will be reluctant to disclose potentially embarrassing or
compromising details
that could be essential to the formulation of an
1 12
defense.
effective
Along these lines, grave Sixth Amendment concerns have been
expressed in the wake of certain regulations promulgated following the
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act that essentially permit the
government to eavesdrop on attorney-client communications in specified
situations.' 13 The fear is that if counsel and client are aware, or even
suspect that the government is listening to their conversations, important

legal processes are matters often too complex and uncertain for a person untrained in the law, so
that clients need to consult lawyers").
110. WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.1.3; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 68 cmt. c
(noting that "a client who consults a lawyer needs to disclose all of the facts to the lawyer and must
be able to receive in return communications from the lawyer reflecting those facts"); Walkowiak,
supra note 59, at 2 (observing that without the privilege, a lawyer's advice might be "rendered
without all the underlying facts" and therefore could be inaccurate).
11. See WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.1.3. This proposition is thought to be somewhat
controversial because it is largely based on speculation and intuition, there being no empirical
evidence to support it. In fact, one of the only empirical studies conducted in this regard suggests
that "lawyers are more likely than nonlawyers to believe that the privilege encourages client
disclosures and that most nonlawyers are unaware of the privilege or erroneously assume that it
extends to communications with a large number of other professionals as well." RESTATEMENT,
supra note 38, § 68, reporter's note. But see ACC SURvEY, supranote 9, at 3 (reporting that ninetythree percent of lawyers surveyed believed that senior-level corporate employees were aware of the
privilege and that sixty-eight percent believed that mid- and lower-level employees were as well).
112. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 68 cmt. c (observing that "clients would be unwilling
to disclose personal, embarrassing, or unpleasant facts unless they could be assured that neither they
nor their lawyers could be called later to testify to the communication").
113. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2005) (granting the Attorney General exclusive authority to have
communications between an attorney and imprisoned client monitored based upon a "reasonable
suspicion" that communications may be utilized to facilitate "terrorism" or "acts of violence"); see
also Robert J. Anello, Justice Under Attack: The Federal Government's Assault on the AttorneyClient Privilege, 1 CARDOZO PuB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 1, 2-8 (2003); Cole, supra note 3, at 55051; Ellen S. Podgor & John Wesley Hall, Government Surveillance of Attorney-Client
Communications:Invoked in the Name of Fighting Terrorism, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 145, 14647 (2003).
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disclosures will not be made, which in turn will have an adverse affect
on the representation.'14
The critical point to keep in mind with regard to the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, as well as the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and the various other nuances of the attorneyclient privilege discussed in the foregoing sections, is that they all
contemplate an individual client being represented by counsel. Do the
same justifications for the attorney-client privilege as between individual
client and attorney support recognition of the privilege in the corporate
context? If the answer is "yes," the question that remains is: What is the
proper scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege? The next section
will examine and critique the historical and existing answers to this
important question.

III.
A.

THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

The Proprietyof the Privilege in the CorporateContext

In light of the particularized elements of the individual attorneyclient privilege and the requirement that they be narrowly construed, it
seems reasonable to conclude that the doctrine should be wholly
inapplicable in a corporate legal setting. In the corporate context,11 5 the
organization itself is recognized as the client, though it can only act
through its directors, officers and other employees.' 16 As such, from a
strict definitional standpoint, the corporate "client," for purposes of the
114. See Anello, supra note 113, at 6 (observing that the "logical outcome of the rule is that the
attorney and client will communicate little and certainly will not discuss strategic facts," which will
inevitably have an adverse effect on the client's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel); Podgor & Hall, supra note 113, at 153-58 (discussing various constitutional concerns
raised by the rule); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1975) (noting that "if the
client knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following
disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in
his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice"); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 38, § 68 cmt. c (observing that "it is assumed that lawyers would not feel free in probing
client's stories and giving advice unless assured that they would not thereby expose the client to
adverse evidentiary risk").
115. Throughout this section, as well as the Article in general, all references that relate in any
way to "corporations" are also intended to encompass all types of corporate or other legally
recognized organizational entities.
116. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977) (noting the
problem posed from a privilege standpoint when "the client is a corporation that can communicate
or receive communications only by or through its human agents"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2004) (recognizing that "[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization
represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents").
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attorney-client privilege, would be incapable of communicating with
counsel. Only the individual constituents of the corporation can do so,
and they are admittedly not the client.
Furthermore, the privilege's principle justification--encouraging
candor between attorney and client so as to facilitate effective legal
representation-on its face, appears to have little application in the
corporate environment.'1 7 This is so because the privilege, to the extent
recognized, would belong to the corporation, as the client, and not to its
directors, officers and employees individually.' 1 8 Accordingly, there
really is no personal incentive for corporate constituents to be candid
with counsel. The confidential protection that is guaranteed is not theirs;
and hence, privilege purists would argue that these individuals would
most likely refrain from disclosing information that might reflect poorly
upon them. 1 9 Therefore, given that a corporate client can act only
through its constituents, if they are not forthcoming with counsel, then
neither is the corporation itself.
In addition, the assumptions that underlie the privilege's traditional
rationale are similarly inapposite when a corporation is the client. 20 For
example, the fundamental notion that the existence of the privilege helps
to encourage clients to seek the assistance of counsel in connection with
their legal problems 12 1 is less convincing in the corporate setting because
businesses "are forced by circumstances and impelled by business
necessity to resort to lawyers.' 22 As one corporate executive put it:
117. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 218-19 (1988) (observing that this standard
justification for the privilege is particularly dubious in the corporate context); Vincent C. Alexander,
The CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants,63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 191,
226 (1989) (suggesting that this rationale is problematic in the corporate context because "any sense
of personal security on the part of the employee may be illusory"). But see id.at 244 (survey of
lawyers and corporate executives revealed that a majority believed the corporate attorney-client
privilege encouraged candor).
118. See Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870, 877 (1993) (observing that this
"encouraging candor" rationale "only works if the communicator controls the privilege"); LUBAN,
supra note 117, at 221 (indicating that in the corporate context, the client is the organization itself);
WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.5.4 (observing that "the benefits of the privilege are solely for the
advantage of the corporation"); Thornburg, Sanctifying, supra note 60, at 173 (suggesting that "[i]t
is very clear that in the corporate setting it is the entity-the corporation-that is the lawyer's client
and not the individual employees of the corporation"); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 73
cmt. j (noting that "[t]he privilege for organizational clients can be asserted and waived only by a
responsible person acting for the organization for this purpose").
119. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; infra notes 202-09 and accompanying text.
120. See WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.5.3 (noting that "general theories advanced to support
the attorney-client privilege.., apply only with diminished strength or not at all to a corporate
client").
121. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
122. WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.5.3.
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"The benefits [of communicating with counsel] outweigh the risks. You
attorney-client privilege is only one of
have to run a business and the
' 123
many factors to worry about."
Moreover, the constitutional principles that are reinforced by the
attorney-client privilege in the individual context have less relevance
with regard to corporations. The Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination is a personal guarantee; and therefore, a corporation, as an
entity, is not entitled to such protection.'1 24 Further, while corporations do
have a right to the effective assistance of counsel, 125 the individualized
nature of this constitutional safeguard seems to lessen its importance in
the corporate context as related to the attorney-client privilege. 126 As a
result, the corporate attorney-client privilege does not further related
27
constitutional purposes in the same manner as the individual privilege.'
Consequently, a plausible case can be made for not extending the
privilege to corporations, and some scholars and courts have, in fact,
argued in support of this position.1 28 Such a viewpoint, however,
represents a very distinct minority. The legal community has
overwhelmingly answered the question of whether the privilege should
be recognized in the corporate context with a resounding "yes."' 129 The
123. Thornburg, Sanctifying, supra note 60, at 165 (quoting from Alexander, supra note 117, at
370).
124. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 85 (1974) (holding that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to corporations).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Phila., Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1979)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel applies to corporate
defendants).
126. See HAZARD, JR., supra note 51, at 275 (observing that "[c]onsiderations of individual
dignity and autonomy that undergird the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are limited to natural persons"); see also WOLFRAM, supra
note 37, § 6.5.3 (noting that arguments based on human dignity offered to support recognition of the
individual attorney-client privilege "are irrelevant" in the corporate context).
127. See infra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 775 (N.D. Il1. 1962),
rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963) (holding that "[s]ince the
primary element of secrecy essential to any claim of the attorney-client privilege is not possible in
the case of a corporation and since in any event the privilege is purely personal,... it is not
available to [corporations]"); LUBAN, supra note 117, at 217-33 (arguing against recognition of the
corporate attorney-client privilege and maintaining that the privilege does not transfer well to the
corporate context); Thornburg, Sanctifying, supra note 60, at 159 (maintaining that "[o]nly
elimination of the corporate attorney-client privilege can free the court system from the distortion
and expense that was created by expanding the privilege to include corporate secrets"); see also
Fischel, supra note 63, at 20, 33 (arguing that the justifications for the attorney-client privilege,
corporate or otherwise, are flawed and that the privilege and related duty of confidentiality should
be abolished).
129. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981) (observing that
notwithstanding the "complications in the application of the privilege [that] arise when the client is
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more difficult and perplexing concern has been with regard to the proper
30
scope and characteristics of the corporate attorney-client privilege.'
B. Recognition of the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege-The
Control Group Test
Although recognition of a corporate attorney-client privilege was
widely regarded as appropriate, the idiosyncrasies of the corporate form
greatly complicated the actual task of determining the scope of this new
doctrine.' 3' To address this difficulty, courts generally applied the rather
straightforward and logical approach of trying to accommodate the
corporate privilege within the individual privilege structure by
3
analogizing
a corporation
a person.1
otherfor
words,
the typical
privilege requirements
had to
to be
satisfied 2 inInorder
the protection
to

a corporation, .. and not an individual ... this Court has assumed that the privilege applies [in this
context]"); Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1962)
(holding that "the availability of the privilege to corporations has gone unchallenged so long and has
been so generally accepted that [the court felt compelled to] recognize that it does exist");
RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 73 reporter's note (observing that "by far the great majority of
courts and commentators assert or assume that the privilege generally extends to corporate and other
organizational clients"); Walkowiak, supranote 59, at 4 (noting that "[iut is well established that the
attorney-client privilege applies to the corporate client"); WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.5.3
(maintaining that "despite the absence of a compelling social reason for extending the privilege to
corporations and similar bodies, every jurisdiction treats corporations as covered by it"); Sexton,
supra note 26, at 444 (observing that "[n]otwithstanding the failure of the Upjohn Court to articulate
a justification for the corporate attorney-client privilege, the issue of the availability of the privilege
to corporations is, for all practical purposes, now settled").
130. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 73 reporter's note (noting the inability of courts and
commentators to agree as to the appropriate scope for the corporate attorney-client privilege); see
also Sexton, supra note 26, at 447 (observing that the "rules for applying the privilege to
corporations and the justifications underlying the existence of the corporate privilege have remained
unclear").
131. See Sexton, supra note 26, at 449 (noting that "[i]n
contrast to the broad consensus among
federal courts regarding the availability of an attorney-client privilege for corporations, conflicting
views have evolved over who in the corporation may communicate as the 'client' for purposes of
the privilege"); Walkowiak, supra note 59, at 4 (observing that "while the prerequisites for asserting
the attorney-client privilege ... are rather straightforward when applied to an individual, they are
not so simple when the client is a corporation"); WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.5.1 (noting that
applying the privilege in the organizational context "has raised problems of great difficulty and
controversy"); see also LUBAN, supra note 117, at 217-33 (arguing against recognition of the
corporate attorney-client privilege).
132. See, e.g., Sexton, supra note 26, at 478-79 (observing that "[i]n general, courts have
developed the contours of the corporate attorney-client privilege by direct analogy to the privilege
possessed by natural persons, that is, they have sought to identify those corporate actors who
sufficiently personify the corporation to be treated as the corporate 'client' and have extended the
protection of the privilege to communications made by the persons thus identified").
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apply133-there had to be a confidential communication between the
client and the attorney for the purpose of seeking or providing legal
advice-but courts had to figure
out the best analog for the "client"
34
setting.
corporate
the
in
element
The first few federal cases that addressed this issue adopted a
surprisingly broad approach. 135 In United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp.,136 for example, the District Court for Massachusetts concluded
that the privilege encompassed any "information furnished by an officer
or employee of [a corporation] in confidence and without the presence of
third parties."'' 37 It has been suggested that such an expansive version of
the privilege was likely a vestige of the less open litigation process that
existed prior to the138advent of liberal discovery under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Over time, this broad view of the corporate attorney-client privilege
waned, with courts engaging in the more focused enterprise of
identifying those corporate constituents who could be viewed as
personifying the organization.1 39 This eventually led to the creation of
what is commonly referred to as the "control group" test. 140 While
jurisdictions came to settle upon slightly different variations, 14 1 this
approach, as originally articulated in Philadelphia v. Westinghouse

133. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.5.1 (noting that in the corporate context "[m]ost
aspects of the general standard for invocation of the privilege ...apply").
134. See id (observing that the "problem has been to determine which persons speak for the
entity client for purposes of invoking the privilege and waiving it"); Sexton, supra note 26, at 449
(noting the necessity of determining the precise identity of the client in the corporate context); see
also Westinghouse, 210 F. Supp. at 485 (noting that the critical question in determining whether a
corporation is protected by privilege is "whether the person making the communication is the client
or Dust] a witness").
135. See WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.5.2 (noting that there were initially no problems with
respect to the implementation of the corporate attorney-client privilege because the few federal
courts exhibited a "tendency to make the privilege very broad").
136. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
137. Id.at 359.
138. See WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.5.2 (observing that the broad privilege "was more in
accord with the pre-1938 modes of litigation by secret and surprise and less in the spirit of modem
trials, which are characterized by extensive pre-trial discovery of an opponent's information").
139. See supra note 132.
140. For a general discussion regarding the control group test, see Note, Attorney-Client
Privilegefor Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARv. L. REv. 424 (1970).
141. See Walkowiak, supra note 59, at 5 (observing that some states have expanded versions of
the control group test in terms of the categories of individuals whose communications may be
deemed privileged); see also Westinghouse, 210 F. Supp. at 485 (noting that "[v]arious
answers.., have been proposed" to the question of how one goes about determining "whether the
person making the communication is the client").
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Electric Corp.,142 recognized corporate communications as privileged

when the following circumstances were present:
[I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he may
be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a
decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the
advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized member of a body or
group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the
privilege would apply. In all other cases the employee would be
merely giving information to the lawyer to enable the latter to advise
those in the corporation
having the authority to act or refrain from
143
acting on the advice.

The clear intent behind the establishment of the control group test
was to squeeze the corporate form into the framework of the individual
attorney-client privilege. As a result, this approach was admittedly
narrow, which was both good and bad. The benefit of such a constricted
application was that it was as true as possible to the privilege's doctrinal
origins and purpose, avoiding the overbreadth of the earlier decisions,
which basically had afforded corporations greater privilege protection
than individuals.
Under the control group test, corporate employees who would be
characterized as mere "fact witnesses" in the individual setting, are
treated in precisely that fashion. Their communications to counsel are no
more protected by the attorney-client privilege than would be
information conveyed by a third-party witness to an attorney in an
individual personal injury matter. More precisely, such communications
would fall under the qualified protection of the work product doctrine,
but not the privilege.44 Communications by other corporate constituents,
however, who, like a client (or agent of a client), are in a position to
make decisions or act on the advice of counsel rightfully qualify for the
absolute protection of the attorney-client privilege. Thus, the narrow
limitations of the control group test can, in fact, be viewed as quite
reasonable.

142.
143.

210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
Id. at 485. It is interesting to note that the court in Westinghouse relied upon Hickman v.

Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the seminal case regarding the work product doctrine, in excluding
from the coverage of the corporate attorney-client privilege communications between counsel and
mere fact witnesses carried out in anticipation of litigation. Id. Such communications are only
entitled to the qualified protection of the work product doctrine. For a discussion of the relationship
between Hickman and the control group test, see Sexton, supra note 26, at 450-51.
144.

See supra note 143.
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The contrary position, expressed most definitively by the Supreme
Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 145 was that restricting the privilege
to a limited, indeterminate group of individuals 146 within a company
actually undermined the ultimate purpose of the attorney-client
privilege-to enhance the effectiveness of legal representation, which in
turn fosters greater compliance with the law. 14 7 More specifically, the
privilege acts to protect a two-way conveyance of information, both the
communication of factual information by the client and the imparting of
legal advice by counsel. 148 In order to provide competent and useful
legal assistance, an attorney needs to be able to gather as much factual
information as possible that relates to the subject matter of the
representation.149 A broader privilege is believed to foster an open
communicative atmosphere, allowing counsel to conduct a more
thorough investigation150 a greater number of corporate constituents
will be amenable to meeting with the corporation's attorney, and counsel
will feel less constricted with regard to whom he or she can speak. These
perceived benefits of a less restrained privilege in the corporate context
led to the establishment of an alternative approach-the so-called
"subject matter" test.
C. Expansion of the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege-TheSubject
Matter Test
The subject matter test was first recognized eight years after the
inception of the control group test in Harper & Row Publishers,Inc. v.
Decker.151 In that case the Seventh Circuit held that the control group
test was under-inclusive, as the corporation's privilege necessarily
needed to cover communications with counsel by certain agents of the

145.

449 U.S. 383 (1981).

146.

See WOLFRAM, supra note 37, § 6.5.4 (noting that under "the terms of the doctrine, the

control group may be different for different legal problems").
147. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 384; Note, supra note 140, at 431 (acknowledging the argument
that "the control group test is so restrictive that the fear of disclosure to outsiders will deter
corporations from gathering information and communicating it to counsel"); Diversified Indus., Inc.
v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977) (observing that "the control group test inhibits the
free flow of information to a legal advisor and defeats the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege... [, and] may result in discouraging communications to lawyers made in a good faith
effort to promote compliance with the complex laws governing corporate activity").
148. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390.
149. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
150. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390-91.
151. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'dper curiam, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
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company who fall outside of the "control group.,
court:

152

According to the

An employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control
group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his
communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the
employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in
the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's
advice is sought by the corporation... is53 the performance by the
employee of the duties of his employment.1
Though broader than the control group approach, this new subject
matter test did not necessarily extend the corporate attorney-client
privilege to those employees or agents who might be characterized as
mere "bystander witnesses."' 154 The court expressly reserved decision
with regard to whether communications by these corporate constituents
would be deserving of any protection.' 55
Nevertheless, some later courts viewed the Harper court's version
of the subject matter test as not restrictive enough, and accordingly
developed slightly different iterations.' 56 For example, the Eighth Circuit
in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,15 7 added a few additional
elements to its edition of the subject matter test, requiring the following
for application of the corporate attorney-client privilege:
(1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal
advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so at the
direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior made the request so
that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter of
the communication is within the scope of the employee's corporate
duties; and (5) the communication is not disseminated beyond those
because of the corporate structure, need to know its
persons 1who,
58
contents.

152. Seeid. at491.
153. Id. at491-92.
154. Id. at491.
155. See id.
156. See Sexton, supra note 26, at 454-55 (discussing several federal court decisions in which
variations of the subject matter test were applied).
157. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
158. Id. at 609. It is interesting to note that the Restatement adopts a broader form of the
subject matter test, omitting the requirement that the communication be made at the direction of a
corporate superior. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 73. Besides the usual prerequisites for
application of the attorney-client privilege, the communication need only be "between an agent of
the organization and a privileged person... [and] concern[] a legal matter of interest to the
organization ... " Id. § 73(2)-(3) (emphasis added).
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Whatever the formulation, courts viewed the subject matter test as
more in keeping with the privilege's goal of encouraging full and candid
communications between attorney and client. 59 Hence, it should have
come as little surprise that when the Supreme Court entered the
corporate privilege fray in Upjohn, it rejected the control group test in
favor of what appears to have been the Diversified court's version of the
subject matter test. The Court, however, refrained from adopting a
definitive framework for deciding corporate privilege coverage, basing
its decision instead on the specific facts before it and suggesting that
60
future matters should be decided in a similar case-by-case manner.'
The facts of Upjohn are thus critical, and likely provide a roadmap for
how best to insure that communications between counsel and corporate
constituents will be protected by the attorney-client privilege, at least at
the federal level.
In this case, defendant Upjohn's independent accountants
discovered during an audit that a corporate subsidiary had made some
"questionable payments" to foreign government officials in order to
obtain government business.' 61 Upon being notified of the payments,
Upjohn's general counsel consulted outside counsel and determined that
62
an internal investigation as to these payments was appropriate.1
In connection with this investigation, the attorneys sent a
questionnaire to certain managerial employees, accompanied by a cover
letter from Upjohn's Chairman of the Board, which described the
purpose and nature of the investigation. 63 The questionnaire sought
detailed information as to any "possibly illegal" payments made by
Another noteworthy approach utilized after Harper and before the Supreme Court's
decision in Upjohn was a combination of both the control group and subject matter tests. In Duplan
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974), the court held that the corporate
attorney-client privilege applied when the following circumstances were present: "(1) the person
communicating on behalf of the corporation is a member of the control group or an employee
authorized to communicate by a member of that group, (2) the subject matter of the communication
is related to the employee's duties in the corporation, and (3) the communication is necessary to the
rendering of legal advice." Sexton, supra note 26, at 454 (summarizing the test employed by the
court in Duplan). The problem with this approach is that it ignores the inherent inconsistency
between the control group and subject matter tests-by combining the two, the court compromised
the underlying rationale for each. See id. at 454 n.43.
159. See, e.g., Diversified, 572 F.2d at 609 (noting that unlike the control group test, the
subject matter test "encourages the free flow of information to the corporation's counsel in those
situations where it is most needed").
160. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396-97 (1981); see also infra notes 17374 and accompanying text.
161. Seeid.at386.
162. See id.
163. Seeid at 386-87.
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64
Upjohn, and was to be responded to in a "highly confidential" fashion.
The employees were instructed to return their responses directly to
Upjohn's general counsel. In addition to distributing the questionnaire,
Upjohn's general and outside counsel also conducted interviews of
various officers6 5 and employees, including the recipients of the
questionnaires. 1
As a result of the investigation, Upjohn voluntarily disclosed
certain questionable payments to the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). The IRS
responded by initiating an investigation of its own, and Upjohn
cooperated to a certain extent. It provided the IRS with lists of the
individuals who responded to the questionnaire, as well as those who
were interviewed, but declined to produce the actual questionnaires or
the notes and memoranda from the internal interviews, with regard to
which Upjohn asserted both the attorney-client privilege and work
166

product doctrine.

The court of appeals rejected Upjohn's privilege claim based on
application of the control group test finding that "[t]o the extent that the
communications were made by officers and agents not responsible for
directing Upjohn's actions in response to legal advice ... that the

communications were not the 'client's.' ' 167 The Supreme Court
disagreed, observing that the control group test "frustrates the very
purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant
information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render
legal advice to the client corporation."' 168 The Court emphasized the
importance of the attorney fact-gathering process to the provision of
sound and informed legal advice, 169 and found that rigidly defining the
group within the corporation to which the privilege could attach
undermined this critical activity. As the court noted:
In the corporate context.... it will frequently be employees beyond
the control group.., who will possess the information needed by the
corporation's lawyers. Middle-level-and indeed lower-levelemployees can, by actions within the scope of their employment,
embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only
164.

Id. at387.

165. See id.
166. Seeid.at 387-88.
167. Id.
168. Id.at 392.
169. See id. at 390 (observing that "the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of
professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to
enable him to give sound and informed advice").
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natural that these employees would have the relevant information
needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately 170
to advise the client
with respect to such actual or potential difficulties.

In addition, extending the privilege beyond the control group,
according to the Court, would increase candor between counsel and
corporate employees, which in turn would foster greater overall
corporate legal compliance. 171 Finally, besides frustrating the purpose of
the attorney-client privilege, the Court also found that the control group
test lacked predictability,
which would hamper the efficacy of the
172
privilege.
corporate
As already noted, in lieu of the control group test, the Supreme
Court opted for a case-by-case approach in determining the applicability
of the corporate attorney-client privilege, 73 and held that under the
specific facts presented, the privilege applied. 174 Although the Court
declined to set forth a bright-line test, its recognition of the privilege
here suggests receptivity to the Diversifiedapproach. 175 Specifically, the
majority's opinion can be read to imply that if confidential
communications are "made by [employees of the corporation,
concerning matters within the scope of the employees' corporate duties,]
to counsel for [the corporation] acting as such, at the direction 1of
76
corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from counsel[,]
then those communications will be protected by the attorney-client

170. Id. at 391. The Court also noted that counsel's legal advice may often "be more significant
to noncontrol group members than to those who officially sanction the advice, and [thus,] the
control group test makes it more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the employees
who will put into effect the client corporation's policy." Id. at 392.
171. See id. at 392 (observing that the control group test's "narrow scope.., makes it difficult
for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their client is faced with a specific legal
problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's
compliance with the law"); see also Sexton, supra note 26, at 469-71 (discussing the "voluntary
compliance" rationale underlying the Upjohn decision).
172. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (noting that "[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports
to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege
at all"); see also Sexton, supra note 26, at 482 (observing that "[p]redictability is necessary because
the relevant actors (the attorney and the information-giver) must judge prospectively whether the
privilege will protect their communication," otherwise the privilege's fundamental purpose of
encouraging candor in attorney-client communications cannot be realized).
173. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396 (stating that "we decide only the case before us, and do not
undertake to draft a set of rules which should govern challenges to investigatory subpoenas").
174. Seeid. at395.
175. See Sexton, supra note 26, at 461 (noting that "some commentators have argued that the
Upjohn Court embraced the modified subject matter test... adopted by the Eighth Circuit in
Diversified').
176. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394.
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privilege so long as the confidential nature thereof is preserved.1 77 It also
seems important that the employees be made "sufficiently aware that
they [are] being
questioned in order that the corporation [can] obtain
' 178
legal advice."

Ultimately, though it touted the need for predictability in this area
and criticized the control group test for its shortcomings in this regard,
the Supreme Court did little to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the
scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege.1 79 Even if one could
accurately characterize the modified-subject matter test recognized in
Diversified as "the test" after Upjohn, uncertainty and potential
overbreadth remain problems. In particular, the Eighth Circuit in
Diversified sought to avoid the possibility of cloaking mere "fact
witnesses" with the privilege by limiting coverage to matters within the
scope of an employee's duties.180 However, depending upon a
corporation's definition of such duties, determining which employees
fall outside of the modified-subject matter test's coverage may prove to
be an exercise in futility-i.e., job descriptions might be expanded for
the purpose of casting a wider privilege net. Hence, this analytical
framework could, in practice, provide more protection than was intended
or is necessary to serve the underlying rationale of the attorney-client
privilege, and may unduly blur the line between the privilege and the
work product doctrine.181
177. See, e.g., Joan C. Rogers, Attorney-Client Privilege:Although CorporateAttorney-Client
Privilege Is Established, Challenges Persist, 16 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 336
(July 5, 2000).
178. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394.
179. See id.at 396-97 (conceding that its case-by-case approach "may to some slight extent
undermine desirable certainty in the boundaries of the attorney-client privilege"); see also id.
at 404
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (criticizing the Court's concession that its holding might undermine
certainty as "neither minimiz[ing] the consequences of continuing uncertainty and confusion nor
harmoniz[ing] the inherent dissonance of acknowledging that uncertainty while declining to clarify
it within the frame of issues presented"); Sexton, supra note 26, at 471 (observing that "[b]y
declining to promulgate a broad rule to govern application of the attorney-client privilege to
corporations, the Justices adopted a course that arguably will occasion unpredictability and
confusion for corporate attorneys, their clients, and the courts").
180. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977) (maintaining
that "[b]y confining the subject matter of the communication to an employee's corporate duties, we
remove from the scope of the privilege any communication in which the employee functions merely
as a fortuitous witness"); see also Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870, 878 (Ariz. 1993)
(en banc) (rejecting a broad formulation of the subject matter test as overly inclusive insofar as it
would protect communications by corporate constituents whose "connection to [a] liability-causing
event [was] too attenuated to fit the classical model of what it means to be a client"); Hamilton,
supranote 25, at 641 (discussing Goodfarb).
181. See supra note 143 (discussing how such communications are more appropriately
protected by the work product doctrine).
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Notwithstanding the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the
corporate attorney-client privilege, one point is clear, and that is Upjohn
provides the standard in federal court when federal law supplies the rule
of decision. 182 This, at a minimum, means that the control group test, at
present, is not a viable approach in this context.
In state courts, on the other hand, both the control group and
subject matter tests, and everything in between appear to be
possibilities. 83 The lack of uniformity between the states in this regard
poses a major problem for national corporations with presences in
various jurisdictions. 84 Under applicable choice of law rules it is
possible that any of the potential approaches could govern, which
probably means, that in many instances, prudent counsel must act as if
the most restrictive test for the corporate attorney-client privilege will
be
85
applicable-in all likelihood that would be the control group test.
For purposes of this Article, the Upjohn test is really the only
approach that needs to be reconsidered as the compelled-voluntary
waiver issue is primarily a federal phenomenon. Hence, the Article's
ultimate proposal only relates to the scope of the federal corporate
attorney-client privilege. Nevertheless, the inconsistencies that pervade
182. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that: "Except as otherwise required
by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State
or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience." FED. R. EVID.
501; see also Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250 (I11.1982) (rejecting the
Upjohn approach under Illinois law and instead opting to adhere to control group standard);
Walkowiak, supra note 59, at 8 (observing that "Upjohn establishes that actions in federal court that
are based upon federal statutes or federal claims require the application of the subject matter test to
corporate [attorney-client] communications"). For a general discussion of the history of Rule 501,
see Julie Elizabeth Rice, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context: The
Intersection of Federaland Illinois Law, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 175, 181-85 (1984).
183. See generally Hamilton, supra note 25; Rice, supra note 182; see also Consolidation
Coal, 432 N.E.2d at 254-56 (discussing various tests employed with regard to the scope of the
corporate attorney-client privilege).
184. See Hamilton, supra note 25, at 649 (noting that "[p]redicting which privilege rule will be
applied.., is difficult for attorneys who represent national corporations, especially if the
organization is faced with a multi-state investigation that could result in both state and federal
claims against the company"); Rice, supra note 182, at 188 (observing that counsel for corporations
that do business in more than one state "must be aware of the approach to the attorney-corporate
client privilege employed by each state in which the corporation conducts business, as well as the
federal approach, because of the possibility of a privilege claim arising in any state").
185. See Alexander, supra note 117, at 309 (reporting one corporate lawyer's responses to an
empirical survey question regarding Upjohn and the control group test: "We're not confident that
privilege applies at all levels;" and another: "I don't trust Upjohn"); Hamilton, supranote 25, at 655
(noting that "it is more likely that the narrower of two privilege rules will apply in a conflict of laws
situation").
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state treatment of the privilege cannot be ignored, and indeed provide
some helpful insight into the type of federal approach that would most
accurately mirror responsible corporate behavior. In other words, if
counsel to large companies must by necessity behave as if the control
group test applies, irrespective of whether it ultimately will, why not
adopt a similar analysis in the federal arena? Moreover, adoption of a
clear, uniform federal approach would likely have significant influence
on the direction that the states take in this regard86in the future, perhaps
leading to greater consistency across the country. 1
These compelling arguments for a uniform approach to the
privilege do not even take into account the perceived problems that
allegedly flow from compelled-voluntary waiver. As the next section
reveals, when such additional concerns are added to the mix,
reconsideration of the scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege
seems all the more necessary and advisable.
IV.

COMPELLED-VOLUNTARY WAIVER AND THE EROSION OF THE
CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

A.

The DOJPolicy

The concept of utilizing an entity's agreement to waive the
attorney-client privilege as consideration for more lenient regulatory
treatment appears to have originated in June of 1999 with the issuance of
the DOJ's Memorandum regarding "Bringing Criminal Charges Against
Corporations," authored by then Deputy Attorney General Eric H.
Holder, Jr. 187 The Holder Memo, as it has come to be called, was
intended to provide guidance with regard to the specific factors that
"should generally inform a prosecutor in making the decision whether to
charge a corporation in a particular case.' 88 Among the eight categories
emphasized by the Holder Memo for prosecutorial consideration was a
"corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in [the investigation of its agents] ....
including, if necessary, a waiver of the [corporate] attorney-client and
186. It is also important to recognize that even absent such nationwide adoption, the proposed
solution of a more restrictive corporate attorney-client privilege test is one to which corporations
and their counsel could adhere without unduly prejudicing their ability to take advantage of extant
approaches that are more liberal. Put another way, to the extent that a state may allow for more
protection, the information covered by a narrower federal privilege would obviously be protected.
See Hamilton, supra note 25, at 658.
187. See Holder Memo, supra note 5.
188. Holder Memo, supra note 5, at 189.
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work product [privileges].. . ."'89 The Holder Memo further elaborated
upon this consideration as follows:
One factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a
corporation's cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure
including, if necessary, a waiver of the attorney-client and work
product protections, both with respect to its internal investigation and
with respect to communications between specific officers, directors,
and employees and counsel. Such waivers permit the government to
obtain statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and targets, without
having to negotiate individual cooperation or immunity agreements. In
addition, they are often critical in enabling the government to evaluate
the completeness
of a corporation's voluntary disclosure and
190
cooperation.
Significantly, notwithstanding these perceived benefits to the
government of waiver, the Holder Memo maintained that the DOJ "does
not ...consider

waiver of a corporation's privileges

an absolute

requirement, and prosecutors should consider the willingness of a
corporation to waive the privileges when necessary to provide timely
and complete information
as only one factor in evaluating the
1' 91
corporation's cooperation."
In January 2003, then Deputy Attorney General Larry D.
Thompson reissued a slightly revised version of the Holder Memo,
entitled
"Principles
of Federal
Prosecution
of Business
Organizations.' 1 92 The critical portions of the Thompson Memo relating
to privilege waiver are virtually identical to those in the Holder Memo,
with one notable exception. In discussing the weight that prosecutors
should attribute to a corporation's willingness to waive the privilege, the
Thompson Memo provides that it should be considered as "one factor"
as opposed to the Holder Memo's "only one factor."1' 93 The effect,

whether or not intended, is to lessen the prior Memo's downplaying of

189. Holder Memo, supranote 5, at 191-92 (emphasis added).
190. Holder Memo, supranote 5, at 192.
191. Id. (emphasis added). See also supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (discussing
government's position that waiver is not routinely demanded).
192. See Thompson Memo, supra note 5. This iteration of the Memo stressed that the "main
focus of [its] revisions [was] increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a
corporation's cooperation." Id.at 1. In particular, the Memo expanded upon the types of corporate
actions that should be considered as being designed to impede the government's investigation; for
example, instructing employees to refrain from fully cooperating. See id.
at 6. Along these lines, the
Thompson Memo added a ninth factor for prosecutorial consideration "the adequacy of the
prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation's malfeasance." Id at 3.
193. Compare id.
at 5, with Holder Memo, supra note 5,at 192.
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the significance of waiver. Though subtle, the message may be that
"willingness to waive" is a moderately more important consideration
under the Thompson Memo.
Whatever faint distinctions exist between the two Memos, the
ultimate result appears to be the same, at least from the perspective of
the corporate bar, namely, routine demands by DOJ for waiver, which
corporations feel compelled to provide. 194 Willingness to waive may
indeed be but a single factor in the "cooperation" analysis, but
corporations clearly perceive that it is a highly significant "one" in the
eyes of the government. The amendment to the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, suggesting that waiver could be a prerequisite to the
reduction of a corporation's culpability score under certain
circumstances,1 95 added further credence to this perception.
B.

The PerceivedEffects of Privilege Waiver

Although significant uncertainty exists under Upjohn with regard to
what corporate communications will be non-discoverable, the corporate
legal community has expressed great concern over the potential
consequences that compelled-voluntary waiver may have on the
corporate attorney-client privilege.1 96 Ironically, the most significant of
these perceived side effects-reduced candor between counsel and
corporate employees-already exists under the current formulation of
the federal privilege, even absent the specter of government-coerced
waiver. The remaining anticipated problems, when closely examined,
seem exaggerated, at best.
At present, there is a widespread sentiment that compelledvoluntary waiver will inevitably result in corporate constituents being
less candid with counsel. 197 According to this argument, if these

194. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. It is important to note that waiver is typically
sought by the DOJ in one of two scenarios: (1) after a corporation has conducted an internal
investigation and self-reported its wrongdoing, apparently to determine the thoroughness and
accuracy of the self-report; or (2) before an internal investigation has even been completed,
essentially requesting a prospective waiver as to anything in the future that might be deemed
privileged. This latter scenario is the one that the corporate legal community finds particularly
troublesome, and one that is believed to be on the rise. See Ben-Veniste & Rubin, supra note 9, at I
(noting the "ever more frequent government practice of seeking a blanket waiver of the privilege
before the company has completed its internal probe").
195. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 233-39 and accompanying
text.
196. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also COALITION SURVEY, supra note 9, at
15 (observing that "instead of advancing the interests of the public, government attorneys have now
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individuals comprehend that the corporation will likely be forced to
waive the privilege at some point in the future, it is most probable that
they will be reluctant to cooperate fully in connection with any internal
investigation. 198 This reluctance is exacerbated, even within the upper
echelons of senior management, by the fact that a waiver as to the
government will likely also effect a waiver of the privilege as to nongovernmental third parties, 199 not to mention as to all other information
that relates to the same subject matter.200 Such corporate reticence tears
at the very heart of the attorney-client privilege's central purpose of
encouraging full and frank communication between lawyer and client.
As a result, many view compelled-voluntary waiver as the death knell to
the privilege in the corporate context.0 1
Such doomsday predictions, however, seem to ignore the fact that
there is ample room for skepticism with regard to how forthcoming
employees are under the existing corporate privilege regime. 2 For one
thing, corporate counsel are duty bound to advise employees with regard
to both the scope of the legal representation and the attorney-client
privilege prior to conducting any sort of interview in connection with a
corporate investigation.20 3 Indeed, something akin to a Miranda-type
created a situation where clients are going to be less, not more, forthcoming") (quoting one Survey
respondent).
198. The potential for corporate employees to keep their mouths shut in connection with an
internal investigation is no doubt considered to be even greater when the corporation has already
effected a prospective waiver of the privilege-i.e., agreed to waiver before the inception of an
internal investigation as to any matters that might later be deemed privileged.
199. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; Van Fleet, supra note 6, at 8 (suggesting that
civil liability brought about by the virtually inevitable blanket waiver of the attorney-client privilege
"alters the cost-benefit analysis executives must make in deciding whether to report a potential
criminal violation" -i.e., accepting a criminal fine may be more cost effective); see also COALITION
SURVEY, supra note 9, at 13 (observing that "[iln addition to a chilling effect on communications
with between [sic] the client and the lawyer, waiver of privilege subjects companies to disclosure of
these materials in litigation, potentially causing grievous harm to the company") (quoting one
Survey respondent).
200. See supra notes 16, 56 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
202. See Sexton, supra note 26, at 463 (observing that "[o]ne may question whether the
attorney-client privilege actually induces any client, individual or corporate, to provide information
that would not otherwise be forthcoming"); see also Thornburg, Sanctifying, supra note 60, at 166
(noting that, as a practical matter, "the existence of the privilege in future litigation is sufficiently
uncertain at the time a communication must be made (or not), that the corporate employee must
simply decide to reveal what she thinks best and take her chances, with the possibility of privilege
playing at most a marginal role"); supra note 117 and accompanying text.
203. See Sara Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics,
Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 940, 941 (2003)
(observing that many practitioners recommend that counsel routinely provide warnings to
employees, whether or not required, and "[m]ost experts agree that the strategic advantages of
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warning might be called for depending upon the circumstances. For
example, one corporate organization has suggested that something along
the lines of the following might be in order as a pre-interview
instruction:
We have been retained to represent the Company to conduct our own
review and investigation of this matter. The Company has requested
that all of its employees cooperate fully and completely in our efforts,
and we trust that you will be forthcoming and truthful in your
responses.
Although we do not represent you personally, what you tell us today is
privileged from disclosure outside the Company. However, the
Company may determine, in its own discretion, to advise ...others
outside the Company[] of the results of our work. The decision of
whether to disclose this information will be made solely by the
Company. If we determine that you are personally at risk in this
investigation, we will advise you. You are free to retain your own
lawyer. Should that be necessary, the Company, under appropriate
circumstances and limits, may be prepared to advance you reasonable
costs and may recommend a lawyer .... Do you
legal fees and 204
understand this?

It should probably go without saying that following such an instruction,
it is highly unlikely that an employee with anything to hide would be
entirely truthful, if he or she would speak at all.20 5
Hence, as a practical matter, attorneys are likely to employ a
warning that is not quite so precise and ominous. Such an approach,
however, can be risky. For instance, if the proffered instructions
reasonably lead a corporate employee to believe that the company's
counsel actually represents him or her personally, a court may legally
recognize that belief, resulting in a host of potential problems for both

providing some type of pre-interview warning outweigh the disadvantages"); Bruce A. Green,
Interviewing Client Officers and Employees: Ethical Considerations,PROF'L LIAB. LITIG. ALERT,

Winter 2005, at 1, 3 (noting the general advisability of the practice of a corporation's lawyers
clarifying "that they are not representing the corporation's officers or employees individually").
204.

AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N, BEST PRACTICES HANDBOOK IN ADvISING CLIENTS ON

FRAUD AND ABUSE ISSUES, Exhibit D (1999); see also Duggin, supra note 203, at 944-46
(discussing district court judge's suggestion of a similar model for a pre-interview warning to a
corporate employee).
205. See Thomburg, Sanctifying, supra note 60, at 174 (observing that providing employees
with "a truthful picture about the limits of the corporate attorney-client privilege [will] not generate
much candor"); see also Duggin, supra note 203, at 946 (noting that such "warnings could bring an
internal investigation to a grinding halt while employees scramble to find individual counsel").
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the corporation and its counsel. 0 6 Most notably, the corporate client may
be disabled from effecting a waiver of the 20attorney-client
privilege as it
7
would belong to the employee individually.
Even successful utilization of less exacting instructions carries with
it the potential of chilling communications between counsel and
corporate employees.20 8 Merely emphasizing that counsel represents the
corporation and not the individual or suggesting the possibility of
voluntary privilege waiver by the corporation can have the same effect
on an employee's willingness to cooperate as the lurking prospect of

206. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 73 cmt. d (noting that "[i]f a lawyer fails to clarify
the lawyer's role as representative solely of the organization and the organization's agent reasonably
believes that the lawyer represents the agent, the agent may assert the privilege personally with
respect to the agent's own communications"); see also Duggin, supra note 203, at 940 (suggesting
that the principal reason for employing pre-interview warnings is "to avoid any possibility that a
court will subsequently permit the individual employee to invoke the protections of the attorneyclient privilege on grounds that an attorney-client relationship existed between investigating counsel
and the interviewee"); Green, supra note 203, at 4 (observing that the "failure to clarify the lawyer's
role poses the risk of inadvertently creating a lawyer-client relationship with the officer or
employee").
It is important to note that, at a minimum, under Model Rule 1.13(d) (followed in some
form by most states), a lawyer is ethically bound to clarify his or her role when it is reasonably
apparent that the company's interests are adverse to the constituent:
In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders
or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of
the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(d) (2004). In addition, similar ethical obligations exist
under Model Rule 4.3, which provides that:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer
shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role
in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice
to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of
such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests
of the client.
Id. at R. 4.3.
207. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333, 337-38 (4th Cir. 2005)
(observing that if corporate counsel enters into an attorney-client relationship with a corporate
constituent, the corporation would not be able to waive that individual's privilege to the extent that a
conflict arises); see also Green, supra note 203, at 4 (suggesting that corporate counsel face the
untenable situation of deciding "whether to give... warnings when they may not be required, and
thus risk discouraging disclosures, or to refrain from [doing so], and thus risk litigation concerning
the propriety of their professional conduct").
208. Indeed, it is likely that many employees misperceive the scope of the attorney-client
privilege or are completely unaware of its existence. Thus, they may approach any interview with
corporate counsel with a certain degree of wariness based on a view that nothing they say will be
held in confidence.
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compelled-voluntary waiver. If an employee has absolutely nothing to
hide, however, he or she will probably be cooperative with or without
the protective cloak of the attorney-client privilege,21 ° and if not, the
corporation could no doubt exert pressure to induce the cooperation
sought.21 '
Another commonly feared by-product of compelled-voluntary
waiver is that attorneys will cease to memorialize in writing the fruits of
investigations and/or the legal advice imparted as a result thereof.2 12 The

209. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also Buchanan, supra note 6, at 600 (noting
that "it is not a new practice for a corporation's lawyers to advise employees in the context of a
criminal investigation that they represent only the corporation, and not the employee, and that this
has implications for the confidentiality of any communications with the employee"); Sexton, supra
note 26, at 467 (observing that because the "threat of waiver or of shareholder litigation is present
whenever there is an issue of corporate liability, [certain employees] might be generally unwilling to
speak to the corporation's attorneys notwithstanding the initial availability of the privilege"). Cf.
Thornburg, Sanctifing, supra note 60, at 167 (noting that "numerous waiver doctrines and
exceptions make it possible that discovery will be allowed even when the privilege would otherwise
protect communications").
Furthermore, even in the absence of the possibility of waiver, it still seems questionable
whether an employee would be entirely forthcoming with counsel. If an employee has done
something improper, fear of reprisal might naturally cause him or her to be less than fully candid
with the company's lawyer, even under an absolute guarantee of confidentiality. See Sexton, supra
note 26, at 466 (noting that some employees "will not speak [with counsel] even if they are assured
that their communications will not be disseminated beyond those involved in the litigation both
because they fear recrimination within the corporation and because they understand that at least
some corporate officials will be privy even to privileged communications").
It is also important to note that employee candor may be undermined by the existence of the
well-established "good cause" exception to the corporate attorney-client privilege in the context of
shareholder litigation against the company, which suggests that under such circumstances, there is a
significant possibility that the privilege will not apply. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); see also Sexton, supra note 26, at 514-16
(discussing the effect of the Garner exception on the willingness of corporate employees to
cooperate with counsel).
210. See Sexton, supra note 26, at 466 (finding it "noteworthy that many individuals-most
particularly those whose interests do not conflict with the corporation-will gladly speak even
without the protection of [the] privilege"); Hamilton, supra note 25, at 647 (observing that "[i]f an
employee is not concerned that a statement's divulgence will later harm her, then she will tend to be
unconcerned about the information that she reveals to corporate counsel").
211. See Thornburg, supra note 60, at 175 (observing that a "corporate employee who refuses
to confide in the corporation's attorney at this employer's request risks disapproval, demotion, and
discharge"); see also Hamilton, supra note 25, at 647 (indicating that a corporation could "threaten
to fire an employee who [is] not forthcoming with relevant information"); Sexton, supra note 26, at
491 (noting that there is really no reason for the privilege under circumstances where the employee
"will communicate with the attorney even if the privilege [did] not exist, or if a nonlegal objective
[would be] sufficient to stimulate communication with the attorney"). Cf Note, supra note 140, at
429 (suggesting that "[w]hen [employees] consider how much to reveal to counsel, they are likely to
be deterred more by the fear that management will be displeased when it learns of their conduct than
by the fear of disclosure to opposing litigants").
212. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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likelihood of this occurring is enhanced by the virtual certainty that any
written materials voluntarily disclosed to the government will lose their
privilege protection as to third parties. 213 A lawyer's ethical duty of
competency combined with a fear of malpractice liability or the
possibility that some other civil or criminal action will be instituted
against him or her seem to provide ample motivation for careful
documentation and record-keeping.2 14
Furthermore, even prior to the inception of compelled-voluntary
waiver, much of the information that an attorney would typically gather
and prepare during the course of an internal investigation would be
protected only by the work product doctrine. As such, a proper showing
by the government or some other third party of substantial need for the
materials and that the substantial equivalent could not be obtained
without enduring undue hardship would have rendered an attorney's
"fact" or "ordinary" work product discoverable.21 5 Even "opinion" work
product,2 16 under exceptional circumstances could be deemed
unprotected.2 17 Notwithstanding this qualified protection, lawyers have
clearly persisted in their practice of memorializing information prepared
in anticipation of litigation in written or other tangible form. Admittedly,
the threat of compelled waiver by the government is somewhat more
intimidating than the prospect of court ordered disclosure of work
product, but the argument that lawyers will refrain from maintaining
proper representation-related records should logically apply to either
scenario. The fact that it does not simply reveals the flawed nature of the
reasoning that is being employed.
In addition, it is significant that more than one federal official has
expressed the view that in the vast majority of situations, the
government is not interested in obtaining what in all likelihood amounts

213. See supranote 15 and accompanying text.
214. See Thornburg, Sanctifying, supra note 60, at 182 (observing that "[a]lthough they would
prefer to communicate in secret, attorneys would not cease to investigate if that secrecy were
removed because too many forces require full and accurate information"). Cf Hamilton, supra note
25, at 647 (maintaining that "[i]f an employee has information relevant to a legal investigation,
counsel will likely pursue it regardless of the applicable privilege rule ... [as] [n]o competent
counsel would face litigation or dispense advice without first learning every possible detail").
215. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3) (defining "work product" as "tangible
things ... prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for [a party] or by or for
that... party's representative"); see also Buchanan, supra note 6, at 596.
216. RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 87(2) (providing that "[o]pinion work product consists of
the opinions or mental impressions of a lawyer; all other work product is ordinary work product").
217. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,401-02 (1981).
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to attorney advice or opinion work product. 2 8 They are most concerned
with discovering factual information that will aid them in their
investigations:
[W]aiver should ordinarily be limited to the factual internal
investigation and any contemporaneous advice given to the corporation
concerning the conduct at issue. Except in unusual circumstances,
prosecutors should not seek a waiver with respect to communications
and work
product
related to advice concerning the government's
• ••
.
.- 219

criminal investigation.

Even if the sincerity of such stated positions can be questioned, the
other incentives present should still serve to encourage corporate counsel
to make a record of his or her investigation and advice. At most, one
might reasonably expect attorneys to exercise greater caution with
regard to what is included in such records as well as the manner in which
certain observations might be worded.
It is also worth noting that the advent of the voluntary disclosure
requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure elicited a
strikingly similar over-reaction from the organized bar in terms of the
predicted negative effect that this procedural innovation would have on
attorneys' ability to advocate effectively on behalf of their clients. 220 In
218. See, e.g., Thompson Memo, supra note 5, at 5 n.3 (stating the limited scope of the waiver
that the government may seek under most circumstances); Buchanan, supra note 6, at 596 (noting
that "the government rarely seeks the attorney's mental impressions of witness interviews"). But see
COALITION SURVEY, supra note 9, at 8-9 (indicating that Survey results suggest that the
government's seeking waiver as to such information may not be as infrequent as the government
maintains).
219. See Thompson Memo, supra note 5, at 5 n.3; see also Buchanan, supra note 6, at 596
(observing that the information disclosed pursuant to "waiver is nearly always attorney work
product concerning the underlying facts, rather than privileged communications"). But see supra
note 218.
220. See Linda S. Mullenix, Adversarial Justice, Professional Responsibility, and the New
FederalDiscovery Rules, 14 REV. LITIG. 13, 39 (1994) (acknowledging the "quasi-hysterical claims
that the new discovery rules will lead to the demise of the adversary system as we know it");
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the "Haves" a Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery
Proposals,52 SMU L. REV. 229, 234 (1999) (recounting the sentiment of many in the defense bar
that "the requirement of automatic disclosure seemed.., incompatible with litigator culture, an
understanding of the 'adversary system,' including discovery, as a process in which the only
operative value is aggressive assertion of the interests of the client"); see also Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, 146 F.R.D. 401, 511 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(observing that, "[bly placing upon lawyers the obligation to disclose information damaging to their
clients--on their own initiative, and in a context where the lines between what must be disclosed
and what need not be disclosed are not clear... -the new Rule would place intolerable strain upon
lawyers' ethical duty to represent their clients and not to assist the opposing side"). Cf Christopher
C. Frost, Note, The Sound and the Fury or the Sound of Silence?: Evaluating the Pre-Amendment
Predictionsand Post-Amendment Effects of the Discovery Scope-Narrowing Language in the 2000
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particular, in 1993, the Federal Rules were amended to require that
certain categories of information be disclosed voluntarily to one's
adversary.22 1 While the original scope of the disclosure requirement was
admittedly too vague and broad, necessitating further narrowing
amendments, 222 many within the bar remained opposed to any type of
voluntary disclosure. In retrospect, these lawyers' fears, though no doubt
heartfelt, were quite exaggerated, and not surprisingly, never realized. 2 3
An ex post assessment of the compelled-voluntary waiver controversy
might yield a similar conclusion.
Finally, many have also expressed the concern that compelledvoluntary waiver will cause corporations to forego conducting internal
investigations altogether.2 24 This is the most drastic and farfetched of the
alleged side effects. Given the enormous incentives that are present for
companies to comply with the law, 225 it seems inconceivable that the
mere prospect of losing the protection of the attorney-client privilege
would cause a company to risk its very existence by simply ignoring
possible corporate wrongdoing.22 6

Amendments to FederalRule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), 37 GA. L. REV. 1039, 1057-59, 1086-87
(2003) (discussing the strong negative reactions from the plaintiffs' bar with regard to amendment
narrowing scope of discovery and concluding that the actual effects have been virtually
unnoticeable).
221. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (1993) (requiring voluntary provision of "the name
and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable
information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings").
222. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(A) (2000) (requiring voluntary provision of "the name
and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable
information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment...").
223. See Frost, supra note 220, at 1056 (observing that "[flears and predictions about that
[disclosure] provision.., were not borne out in practice"). Cf Mullenix, supra note 220, at 46
(observing that "Justice Scalia's concerns about the relationship among the [1993] discovery rules
[amendments], professional responsibility, and the adversary system have a Chicken-Little 'sky-isfalling' quality").
224. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
225. See Duggin, supra note 203, at 887 (observing that "in the wake of the Enron, World
Com, Tyco and other recent corporate financial fiascos, the risks of failing to recognize significant
legal problems.., are greater than ever before").
226. See LUBAN, supra note 117, at 218 (observing that "[l]arge organizations have no
alternative to cycling all of their legally relevant information through the general counsel's office,
no more than they have to sending financial information to their (unprivileged) accountant");
Sexton, supra note 26, at 464 (noting that "several commentators have argued that because of the
exigencies of the regulatory state and because of their general business needs, corporations would
communicate with attorneys even if the privilege were not available"); id at 465 (observing that
employees and even some members of senior management may not place the good of the institution
above personal interests, and therefore, might withhold or distort information in the absence of
privilege protection). Cf Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870, 879 (Ariz. 1993) (suggesting
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Notwithstanding the ability to explain away many of the purported
problems that compelled-voluntary waiver creates, recent empirical
studies by the Association of Corporate Counsel ("ACC") and the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL") provide
some tangible evidence that the corporate legal community's concerns
may be more than just exaggerated speculation. 2 7 Among the 363 inhouse lawyers that responded to the ACC Survey, and the 365 outside
attorneys that responded to the NACDL Survey, 95% expressed the view
that there would be a "'chill' in the flow [and] candor" of
communications between clients and counsel in the absence of the
protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine.228
In addition, 30% of the ACC Survey respondents believe that their
clients personally experienced an erosion of their privilege and work
product protection.2 29 The NACDL Survey, on the other hand, revealed
that a slightly higher percentage of outside counsel hold this opinion47% out of 344 respondents.2 30
The Surveys also provided respondents with the opportunity to
convey their personal views regarding such issues as waiver, the benefits
of the privilege and the consequences that would accompany the erosion
thereof. Summaries of these responses were consistent with the views
already discussed in this section. 23 1 Along these lines, it is perhaps most
significant to note that the overwhelming sentiment in both Surveys was
that the attorney-client privilege improved a lawyer's ability to
"monitor,"
"enforce,"
and/or "improve company compliance
232
initiatives.,
In November 2005, the ACC and NACDL Survey results were
presented to the United States Sentencing Commission in connection
with the Commission's re-examination of the commentary language
regarding the privilege contained in Chapter 8 of the Sentencing
Guidelines. 233 In response, the Commission requested additional

that "in most cases [corporations] will conclude that ignorance is too high a price to pay to avoid
taking witness statements that are potentially discoverable").
227. See ACC SURVEY, supra note 9; NACDL SURVEY, supra note 9. For an earlier, similar
empirical study regarding the corporate attorney-client privilege, see generally Alexander, supra
note 117.
228. See ACC SURVEY, supranote 9, at 3; NACDL SURVEY, supra note 9, at 3.
229. See ACC SURVEY, supra note 9, at 3.
230. See NACDL SURVEY, supra note 9, at 4.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 197-201, 212-13, 224,
232. See ACC SURVEY, supra note 9, at 4; see also NACDL SURVEY, supra note 9, at 7.
233. See COALITION SURVEY, supranote 9, at 2; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

49

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 34:897

information with respect to the frequency and effects of government
demands for waivers.2 34 This request, among others, spurred the ACC
and NACDL, along with a sizable contingent of similarly interested
organizations, 235 to conduct a second, more comprehensive survey
("Coalition Survey"), the results of which were submitted in March 2006
to the House Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism
236
and Homeland Security.
Over 1200 in-house and outside counsel responded to the Coalition
Survey, and the overwhelming sentiment expressed was that demands
for privilege waiver have become the norm.237 Specifically,
approximately seventy-five percent of the respondents agreed that a
"culture of waiver" now exists, within "which governmental agencies
believe it is reasonable and appropriate for them to expect a company
under investigation 'to
broadly waive attorney-client privilege or work
238
product protections.
The Coalition Survey apparently had the desired effect, inspiring a
vote by the Sentencing Commission on April 5, 2006, to remove the
privilege waiver language from its Guideline commentary.2 39
Nevertheless, one might still reasonably question the significance of its
and the other two surveys' results given that all three largely appear to
convey only the subjective perceptions and accounts of the corporate
bar. Consequently, they can be viewed collectively as little more than an
exclamation point behind the extant anecdotal evidence proffered by
waiver critics. Whatever credence one is willing to give to these studies,
at a minimum, they do confirm that there is a widespread and genuinely
held belief that compelled-voluntary waiver will adversely affect
corporate counsel's ability to provide quality, effective legal
representation. Whether real or imagined, that belief alone could prove
to be a self-fulfilling prophecy, which is enough to establish the
existence of a very real problem. The next section discusses one of the
principal remedial measures that has been proposed thus far in response.

234. See COALITION SURVEY, supranote 9, at 2.
235. The other organizations involved included: American Chemistry Council; Business Civil
Liberties, Inc.; Business Roundtable; The Financial Services Roundtable; Frontiers of Freedom;
National Association of Manufacturers; National Defense Industrial Association; Retail Industry
Leaders Association; U.S. Chamber of Commerce; and Washington Legal Foundation. See id.
at 1.
236. See Coyle, supra note 8. See generally COALITION SURVEY, supra note 9.
237. See generally COALITION SURVEY, supra note 9.
238. Id. at 3; see also id.at 6 (observing that "[ilt is clear that this has become the 'rage'
among prosecutors") (quoting one Survey respondent).
239. See supra note 6. The revision will not take effect until November 1, 2006, assuming that
Congress does not act to the contrary. See id.
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V. RECOGNITION OF THE SELECTIVE WAIVER DOCTRINE AS A
REMEDY TO THE COMPELLED-VOLUNTARY WAIVER PROBLEM

It virtually goes without saying that the most serious over-arching
concern with regard to compelled-voluntary waiver is the reality that
corporate acquiescence thereto will result in waiver of the privilege as to
third parties, most notably, potential plaintiffs and their counsel.2 4 ° Many
have argued that this problem could be remedied through recognition,
24
judicially or legislatively, of the concept of selective waiver. 1
Specifically, according to such proposals, companies should be allowed
to effect a waiver as to the DOJ, or other government agency, but still be
able to maintain the privilege with regard to others.2 42
Although a few courts have expressed a willingness to recognize
selective waiver, 243 primarily only when the government has explicitly
agreed to maintain the confidentiality thereof,244 most courts have
rejected the doctrine altogether. 245 The rationale for this strict "no
selective waiver" position is based primarily on the elements of the
attorney-client privilege and the requirement that it be narrowly
construed. In particular, an authorized disclosure of a privileged
communication to any non-privileged person destroys the required
"confidential" nature of that communication, thereby rendering it no
longer privileged for all purposes. In In re Subpoena Duces Tecum,246
for example, the D. C. Circuit insisted that "'the attorney-client privilege
should be available only at the traditional price: a litigant who wishes 247
to
assert confidentiality must maintain genuine confidentiality.'
240. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also COALITION SURVEY, supra note 9, at
4 (suggesting that Survey results indicate that third party lawsuits are among the top consequences
stemming from investigations by the government).
241. See, e.g., Pinto, supra note 35, at 382-88.
242. See supranotes 35-36 and accompanying text.
243. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (recognizing
selective waiver outright because "[11o hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the
developing procedure of corporations to employ independent outside counsel to investigate and
advise them").
244. See, e.g., In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993) (expressing
willingness to recognize selective waiver when either a common interest is shared between the
disclosing party and the government or the government and the disclosing party enter into an
explicit confidentiality agreement); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. of Am. v. Shamrock Broad.
Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 644-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (recognizing selective waiver when "the right to
assert the [attorney-client] privilege in subsequent proceedings is specifically reserved at the time
the disclosure is made").
245. See supra note 15.
246. 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
247. Id.at 1370 (quoting Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir.
1981)).
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Although there are exceptions to this rule, such as when co-parties share
privileged information in the context of joint or common interest
arrangements, these are viewed as being consistent with the privilege's
underlying purpose of encouraging
candid communications to facilitate
2 48
effective representation.
Another related reason for rejecting selective waiver is the view
that one should not be able to use the privilege in order to gain what
amounts to a tactical advantage. In In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare
CorporateBilling Practices Litigation,24 9 the court observed that "any
form of selective waiver, even that which stems from a confidentiality
agreement, transforms the attorney-client privilege into 'merely another
brush on an attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated to gain tactical
or strategic advantage.' 250 The privilege is an absolute protection, not to
be bartered away with regard to some, but not others. 5 1 To put it
euphemistically, corporations should not be permitted to have their cake
and eat it too.
Notably, some courts have treated the work product protection
differently with regard to selective waiver, which is largely a function of
the distinct purpose for which that doctrine exists. 2 Specifically, the
primary reason for affording protection to work product materials is to
prevent an adversary from obtaining a tactical advantage in litigation
through the acquisition of an opponent's trial preparation materials.2 53
Thus, the work product doctrine really only applies as between
adversaries in pending or prospective litigation. As a result, sharing
work product with someone who may be characterized as a non-

248. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423-24 (3d
Cir. 1991).
249. 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
250. Id. at 302 (quoting In re Steinhardt, 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993)).
251. See Permian Corp., 665 F.2d at 1221 (maintaining that a "client cannot be permitted to
pick and choose among his opponents, waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of
confidentiality to obstruct others, or to invoke the privilege as to communications whose
confidentiality he has already compromised for his own benefit").
252. See, e.g., In re McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 20743, 2005 WL 934331 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31,
2005) (recognizing selective waiver as to work product materials disclosed to the government
because of the benefits that flow to the public and in keeping with authority that suggests work
product protections can be preserved through a negotiated confidentiality agreement with the
government). But see McKesson Corp. v. Green, 610 S.E.2d 54 (2005) (finding waiver as to work
product materials voluntarily turned over to the SEC because the SEC did not share a common
interest and confidentiality agreement did not completely preclude disclosure by the SEC); In re
Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d 289, at 304-07 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting selective waiver as to work
product materials notwithstanding confidentiality agreement).
253. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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adversary is not contrary to the purpose of the immunity.2 54 Therefore,
some courts have held that a corporation's waiving of the work product
doctrine as to the government does not result in a blanket waiver as to
third parties, provided that a reasonable confidentiality agreement is in
place between the company and the government.25 5
Such a rationale, however, is not applicable to the attorney-client
privilege, as the disclosure of a privileged communication to anyone,
adversary or not, is wholly inconsistent with the elemental prerequisites.
Nevertheless, proponents of selective waiver have raised some fairly
compelling public policy arguments in support of their position. These
are perhaps best articulated in Judge Danny J. Boggs' dissent in In re
Columbia/HCA.256

This case involved an investigation by the DOJ into some
questionable practices engaged in by Columbia/HCA that resulted in the
over-billing of Medicare and Medicaid patients. The hospital conducted
an internal audit of its billing practices and the DOJ requested the results
thereof in connection with its investigation. After initial resistance, the
hospital acquiesced, following a change in management, and disclosed
the information sought by the DOJ, including materials subject to
protection under the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine.257 Prior to this disclosure, however, it was agreed that: (1) the
DOJ would keep all of the information produced strictly confidential as
consideration for the hospital's cooperation; and (2) the production
would not constitute a general waiver of the attorney-client privilege and
work product protections. 258
The DOJ and hospital eventually settled the matter for a reported
$840,000,000.259 Not surprisingly, this led to a number of private civil

actions against Columbia/HCA, in the context of which demands were
made for the production of the audit materials that had been turned over
to the DOJ. Columbia/HCA objected based on the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine, and in response, the plaintiffs
argued that those protections had been waived. 260 Thus, the issue of
254. See Browne, Inc. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that
"disclosure simply to another person who has an interest in the information but who is not
reasonably viewed as a conduit to a potential adversary will not be deemed a waiver of the
protection").
255. See, e.g., In re McKesson, 2005 WL 934331; Permian,665 F.2d 1214.
256. 293 F.3d at 307-14.
257. See id. at 292.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 293.
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whether a defendant can selectively waive the attorney-client privilege
and/or work product doctrine was ultimately squarely put before the
Sixth Circuit and that court rejected the concept. As with the majority of
the Circuit Courts that have addressed the issue, the Sixth Circuit, in an
opinion written by Judge Thomas B. Russell, simply could not reconcile
selective waiver with the fundamental elements of the protections or
with the underlying purpose of fostering full and frank communications
between attorney and client.
Unlike the rest of the court, Judge Boggs did not feel moored to the
strict doctrinal underpinnings of the attorney-client privilege. According
to him, given that the attorney-client privilege is a creature of common
law, it was appropriate for the court to utilize its "reason and
experience" in shaping the privilege's contours. 261 The over-riding
public policy at issue, according to Judge Boggs, was the government's
interest in ferreting out corporate wrongdoing. He maintained that the
government's mission in this regard is to protect the public, and judicial
acknowledgment of selective waiver will enable it to do so more
effectively and efficiently.262 Indeed, he would go so far as to claim that
in the absence of selective waiver, the government would 263
have no other
means to obtain potentially critical privileged information.
Judge Russell, writing for the majority, accredited the possible
gains in efficiency noted by Judge Boggs, but was troubled by the
countervailing policy concerns created by selective waiver. Specifically,
he felt that it would be difficult to define who constituted "the
government" for purposes of selective waiver. For example, should
citizens acting under federal authority as private attorneys general be
included within the definition? 264 In addition, he viewed selective waiver
as, in essence, making the government an accessory to corporate
wrongdoing, concealing potentially helpful information from third

261.
262.

Id. at 310 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
Id. at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting). It should be noted that Judge Boggs would only extend

availability of selective waiver to a party's dealings with the government, and might require a
confidentiality agreement between the government and the waiving party. Id. at 313.
263. Id. at 311 (Boggs, J., dissenting). Judge Boggs also expressed the view that since there
was no dispute as to whether the information sought was protected by the attorney-client privilege,
the burden should have been placed on the plaintiffs to prove waiver, rather than on Columbia/HCA
to disprove it. Id. at 308. In addition, he criticized the court's hindsight conclusion that if a party
disclosed privileged information in the future, then the protection was unnecessary to encourage the
communication in the first instance. On the contrary, Judge Boggs maintained that one's decision to
disclose privileged information in light of intervening circumstances sheds no light on one's prior
willingness to be forthcoming. Id. at 309-10,
264. See id. at 303.
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parties who have been or may be harmed.26 5 According to him, the
government possesses other means besides waiver for obtaining the
same information and should pursue those avenues.
The real point of contention between the judges is that Judge Boggs
believes that in the absence of selective waiver, corporations will not be
forthcoming with the government, while Judge Russell concludes that
corporations will still cooperate and suggests that selective waiver's only
benefit is that it makes the government's job easier and cheaper, effects
that are outweighed by other more important policy concerns. Their
disagreement captures well the heart of the selective waiver debate.
Whether or not one favors adoption of this doctrine hinges upon the
significance attributed to the promotion of corporate investigations by
the government. At present, the strong doctrinal basis of the privilege,
combined with other practical considerations, make the prospect of a
trend in the direction of judicial acceptance of selective waiver remote.
Notwithstanding this, legislative recognition of selective waiver is
certainly a possibility. Prior efforts in this regard, however, have been
unsuccessful. 266 In addition, selective waiver does not appear to be a
popular remedy among the corporate community, as it may actually
increase the government's compelled-voluntary waiver efforts, and in
the end, the corporations are still being forced to disclose information
that they would rather keep strictly confidential. As a result, the various
side effects of compelled-voluntary waiver likely would not be
alleviated by recognition of selective waiver. Given this, devoting any
further energy towards its codification seems ill advised and will only
serve to detract attention from the real issue-the corporate attorneyclient privilege itself, as elaborated upon in the next section.
VI.

RETHINKING THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Although there are obvious deficiencies and difficulties associated
with the selective waiver doctrine, the ABA's rigid "pro-privilege/antiwaiver" stance,267 and the DOJ's mandate for greater oversight of waiver

265. See id.
(observing that "[t]he investigatory agencies of the Government should act to bring
to light illegal activities, not to assist wrongdoers in concealing the information from the public
domain").
266. For example, in 2004, a bill was introduced in the United States House of Representatives
that would have officially recognized selective waiver as to documents and information supplied to
the SEC. See Buchanan, supra note 6, at 606-07. Although approved by the House Financial
Services Committee, the bill was not passed by the House in 2004 and has apparently not been
reintroduced.
267. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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requests,2 68 their common fundamental shortcoming stems from the
analytical frame of reference being utilized. Rather than myopically
viewing compelled-voluntary waiver as the problem to be solved, the
selective waiver proponents, the ABA and the DOJ would be better
served by focusing their attention on the corporate attorney-client
privilege itself. More to the point, the debate should center around
reconstituting the privilege in the federal context in such a way as to
enable corporations and their counsel to shield the information that they
most desire to be protected-such as, legal advice from counsel and
communications to counsel by corporate constituents who are capable of
binding the corporation or rendering it criminally or civilly liable.
While the government would no doubt welcome the acquisition of
these types of communications, various agency officials have
represented that this is not the sort of information that the government
typically seeks through waiver. 269 Thus, reform efforts should be
directed towards defining the corporate attorney-client privilege in a
manner that preserves the protection in its most fundamental form, and
encouraging the pertinent government agencies to commit formally to
seeking waiver of such a privilege only in very limited circumstances.
There are unquestionably various possibilities for reworking the
corporate privilege, but the author favors the adoption of a variation of
the traditional control group test. The critical issue with regard to this
approach relates to how one defines "control group." The traditional
scope of the control group has been criticized as being under-inclusive,
particularly with regard to its failure to encompass corporate employees
whose conduct in a given matter could render the corporation vicariously
liable. 270 As a result, the author recommends adopting something along
the lines of the description employed in Comment 7 to ABA Model
Rule 4.2 27 which describes the corporate constituents with whom
opposing counsel may not speak when the corporation is known to be
represented by counsel. This Comment provides that, in the absence of

268.
269.

See supranotes 33-34 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 7-8 and accompanying text.

270. See Hamilton, supra note 25, at 650 (observing that "[i]f a non-control group employee
exposes his employer to liability, it is reasonable for the corporation to have control over whether
the employee's communications concerning the liability-causing event are privileged").
271.

Model Rule 4.2, commonly referred to as the "anti-contact" rule, provides as follows:

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by
law or a court order.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 4.2 (2004).
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consent from a corporation's attorney, opposing counsel is prohibited
from communicating with the following corporate employees about the
matter that is the subject of the representation:
A constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly
consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has
authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter or
whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be
272 imputed
to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability.
Only communications between individuals falling within this
description and the company's counsel regarding the subject of the
representation should be protected by the corporate attomey-client
privilege. In other words, only communications "with those employees
who exercise managerial responsibility in the matter, who are alleged to
have committed the wrongful acts [that are] at issue... or who have
authority on behalf of the corporation to make decisions about the course
of the [representation]" would be covered.27 3
The rationale for borrowing the Model Rule definition, rather than
some other approach, is that its description comes as close as possible to
articulating a true corporate analog for the individual client paradigm.274

272. Id. R. 4.2 cmt. 7. Cf. Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870, 879-80 (Ariz. 1993)
(relying on an earlier iteration of this comment to Model Rule 4.2 in advocating a functional
approach to the corporate attorney-client privilege, narrower than the subject matter test but broader
than the control group formulation). Professor Sexton suggests a similar formulation that he
maintains would be consistent with the teachings of Upjohn. Specifically, his privilege would
protect:
Communications of those persons (otherwise qualifying) who, either when they are
speaking or after they have acquired their information: (1) possess decisionmaking
responsibility regarding the matter about which legal help is sought, (2) are implicated in
the chain of command relevant to the subject matter of the legal services, or (3) are
personally responsible for or involved in the activity that might lead to liability for the
corporation.
Sexton, supra note 26, at 500.
273. Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, P.C. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 764 N.E.2d
825, 833 (Mass. 2002) (describing the corporate constituents with whom counsel are prohibited
from speaking under the Massachusetts' version Rule of 4.2, which the court there interpreted in a
fashion consistent with Comment 7 to Model Rule 4.2); see also supra note 272.
274. Cf Messing, 764 N.E.2d at 833-34 (maintaining that its interpretation of the protection
afforded by Rule 4.2 in the corporate context was "consistent with the purposes of the rule, which
are not to 'protect a corporate party from the revelation of prejudicial facts,' . . . but to protect the
attorney-client relationship and prevent clients from making ill-advised statements without the
counsel of their attorney"). For a similar privilege formulation, see Sexton, supra note 26, at 500;
see also supra note 272.
Another viable possibility might be the approach adopted by the Supreme Court of Arizona
in SamaritanFound. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993). In that case the court held:
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In light of the fact that recognition of the individual attorney-client
privilege presupposed creation of the corporate variety, it seems only
logical to define the scope of the corporate privilege in a fashion that
aligns it most closely with the origins and justifications for the
individual privilege.27 5 The modified control group approach that this
Article advocates does just that.
First, it is important to acknowledge that the significance of the
individual privilege is at its apex when it protects client information in
the possession of the attorney that would have been undiscoverable if
retained by the client. Otherwise, the client would understandably be
reluctant to communicate openly and candidly with his or her counsel.
This concept is consistent with the views expressed by the Supreme
Court in Fisher v. United States,276 and serves to reinforce an
individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as
well as the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Specifically, a client does not waive his or her Fifth Amendment
privilege by conveying protected information to counsel, and hence, can
freely communicate such information to counsel, thereby enhancing the
attorney's ability to carry out the representation effectively.
While a corporation admittedly may not be entitled to these
constitutional safeguards in the same sense as an individual, 277 if one is
truly seeking to analogize the corporate attorney-client privilege to the
individual variety, then it is important to construct a privilege that allows
for similar protections. By narrowing the group of corporate
representatives whose communications would be covered by the
privilege to those who are capable of controlling or binding the entity in
some fashion, the privilege is necessarily focused upon the type of

[W]here an investigation is initiated by the corporation, factual communications from
corporate employees to corporate counsel are within the corporation's privilege only if
they concern the employee's own conduct within the scope of his or her employment and
are made to assist counsel in assessing or responding to the legal consequences of that
conduct for the corporate client.
Id. at 872-73. Though certainly an improvement over the subject matter or modified subject matter
tests, the author does not think that this definition is narrow enough to be sufficiently aligned with
the scope of the individual privilege. It should also be noted here that the Arizona legislature
apparently overruled Goodfarb in favor of an approach more along the lines of Upjohn. See
Hamilton, supra note 25, at 642.
275. Cf. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d at 876 (holding that it was appropriate to "apply to corporations
the same reasoning as has been applied in regard to natural persons in reference to [the attorneyclient] privilege") (quoting D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 388 P.2d 700, 709 (1964)).
276. 425 U.S. 391 (1976); see also supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text; Sexton, supra
note 26, at 480-82.
277. See supranotes 124-27 and accompanying text.
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information that would most be entitled to coverage under the individual
attorney-client privilege.
In addition, the revised scope suggested would prevent the
corporate privilege from affording organizational clients greater
protection than individuals. In particular, one of the principal concerns
associated with the subject matter test is the risk that it covers even
communications between counsel and employees who amount to mere
fact witnesses, 278 persons who would undoubtedly not fall beneath the
privilege umbrella in a non-corporate setting. At most, in the individual
context, these witnesses' statements would be entitled to the qualified
protection of the work product doctrine, and the same should be true
when the client is a corporation.
In a similar vein, the individual privilege protects communications
between duly authorized agents of the client and counsel. 279 The same
would essentially be the case under the proposed corporate privilege, as
it includes not only individuals who are the controllers or decisionmakers for the company, but also those whose actions may be attributed
to the entity with respect to a given set of circumstances.
From a historical, doctrinal perspective it is critical that the
corporate privilege track the individual privilege as closely as possible,
but it is also significant that in doing so, a number of benefits are
achieved. For one thing, it lessens the conceptual asymmetry that
presently exists between those whose communications may come within
the scope of the privilege and those who are permitted to make decisions
regarding the invocation or waiver thereof.2 80 Specifically, the Upjohn
approach potentially protects information conveyances from even lowlevel employees, but limits the ability to waive the privilege to those
281
who would fall within the traditional definition of the control group.

Under the proposed version of the corporate privilege, these two groups
would be more closely aligned, if not identical, in most instancesagain, creating greater doctrinal cohesiveness between the individual and
corporate privileges.

278. See supra notes 154-55, 180 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
280. See Sexton, supra note 26, at 505-10 (discussing the problems created by the
inconsistency of permitting only the corporation alone, through its control group, to invoke or waive
the privilege). Cf Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporateand Related Attorney-Client PrivilegeClaims: A
Suggested Approach, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 279, 306 (1984) (arguing for limiting corporate attorneyclient privilege to communications by individuals "who have authority to control the subsequent use
and distribution of the communications").
281. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
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Another fairly obvious benefit is the increased degree of
predictability that should flow from the revised approach. Predictability
is the characteristic that Justice Rehnquist maintained was essential with
regard to the corporate privilege, yet he and the rest of the Court failed
to achieve this ideal in Upjohn, resigning themselves to what amounted
to a case-by-case analysis. 282 While the proposed privilege does not rise
to the level of an unequivocal bright-line test that will enable counsel to
predict in every instance when a particular communication will be
protected, it provides a far more definitive construct than that which is
currently employed.
Finally, and for purposes of the compelled-voluntary waiver, most
importantly, the proposed corporate attorney-client privilege will protect
that about which corporations are primarily concerned-legal advice and
incriminating statements attributable to the corporation-while leaving
unprotected that which is reportedly of most interest to the
government-factual information.2 83 The result is that corporations can
be deemed "cooperative" by turning over the unprotected factual
materials without the necessity of waiver and the related concerns that
accompany it-i.e., subject matter waiver and waiver as to third parties.
An obvious question that remains is: How will this new privilege be
implemented? There appear to be two possibilities. The first is that in an
appropriate case, the Supreme Court could be urged to overrule Upjohn
in favor of the approach suggested, or some similar approach. Although
the likelihood of this occurring may be somewhat remote, given the
nature of the problems associated with the corporate attorney-client
privilege, as revealed in this Article, it is not implausible that the Court
could be convinced to reconsider this seminal case. A more realistic
method of implementation would be through legislation. Because
Upjohn only applies in federal matters, Congress could legislatively
overrule that decision.
Either remedial vehicle, of course, leaves unaddressed the problem
created by the disparate corporate attorney-client privilege approaches
employed throughout the states. 84 Nevertheless, it seems realistic to
assume that the federal enactment of a uniform privilege will have
somewhat of a trickle down effect and will eventually take hold at the
state level as well. Indeed, the ABA, as the foremost purveyor of model

282. See supra notes 173, 179 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
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guidelines for lawyers, could go a long way to making this a reality by
adding its considerable imprimatur to any such legislative reform.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Compelled-voluntary waiver of the corporate attorney-client
privilege by the government is perhaps the most significant concern
presently facing corporations and their attorneys. The prospect of having
to cooperatively disclose materials that would otherwise be held in te
strictest of confidence undeniably affects, to some degree, all aspects of
the corporate attorney-client relationship. Perhaps not to the extreme
level that many suggest, but some adverse effect seems inevitable, even
if it only stems from the doomsday mindset that many corporate lawyers
and their clients have adopted-if they truly believe that the privilege is
dead, it's difficult to dispute that they may be acting as if this is really
the case.
When something appears to be dead or dying, the proper solution is
not to merely proclaim that it is alive and well or to behave as if bandaid type remedies will do the trick. The only solution is to breath new
life into the declining vessel. The new life that the waning corporate
attorney-client privilege needs is a reconstitution in light of the many
changes in corporate America and corporate oversight that have
occurred over the past quarter of a century. The specific solution offered
in this Article may not be the answer, but it nevertheless seems clear that
refocusing the debate on the scope and doctrinal origins of the corporate
attorney-client privilege is essential to resolving the compelledvoluntary waiver paradox.
QUESTION AND ANSWER

PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: Chuck Wolfram. Lonnie, I have an
empirical question. Just listening to you describe the policy statement,
the memorandum of the Justice Department. If I were a lawyer advising
a client and the client asks, well, are they going to ask for it or not, I
think just looking at the policy, I have to say, I haven't the foggiest idea.
Are there any further elaboration standards, for example, of when a U.S.
attorney should or should not ask for a voluntary waiver? And I guess
the ultimate empirical question is, how much of this is going on?
PROFESSOR BROWN, JR.: It depends on who you ask. Actually,
if you ask corporate lawyers they say it goes on all the time. And
actually, there are two empirical studies that were recently done, and one
of the problems was that there wasn't really any evidence of how
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frequently this was being done, as well as what the effect really was on
the corporate attorney-client privilege. So the Association of Corporate
Counsel and the National Association of the Criminal Defense Lawyers
did a survey, one of in-house counsel, one of outside counsel on this
issue, and I think ninety-five percent said that this is having a negative
effect on privilege. 8 5 They also overwhelmingly suggested that this is
being done on a routine basis, almost automatic for a U.S. attorney to
make the request. On the other hand, there's a U.S. attorney, I think her
name is Mary Beth Buchanan, who recently wrote an article in Wake
Forest Law Review, 286 and she sits on the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's ad hoc advisory committee, and they did a survey of U.S.
attorneys and she said you can count on two hands as to the number of
times that waiver has been requested. And that was doing a survey of the
various U.S. attorneys offices, so there's a complete disagreement as to
how frequently it's done. I had conversations with Larry Thompson who
taught at Georgia for a semester, and he suggested too that it's not being
done nearly as frequently as corporations think, but I believe that the
fear that it might be is probably still enough to affect behavior. How
frequently it's actually occurring, I don't know. I tend to think that it's
probably going on a lot more than the Justice Department is trying to
argue.
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: Thank you.
PROFESSOR POWELL: I just wanted to follow up with reference
to the Buchanan article and her report as to how frequently this was
used. The commission was in fact aware of her study. The American
Corporate Counsel engaged in their survey to correct the report. After
Buchanan had written her article and had suggested, if there was any
basis for it, so at least in terms of the newest evidence, the commission
at least had both views in front of them as it was weighing this matter.
Secondly, the testimony was overwhelming, by corporate counsel of all
stripes. They had already begun changing the way in which they did
their business. You make reference to the fact that notes would not be
taken and that sort of thing---corporate counsel will report. They had
already moved on in that direction, and that was out of fear, the same
fear that Professor Wolfram raised. They simply were unsure as to how
vigorously the Justice Department was going to pursue this, which raises
285. NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIM. DEFENSE LAWYERS, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IS
UNDER ATTACK, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/Legislation/OvercriminalizationOO2
(last visited Feb. 21, 2006).

286.

Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperationby Business Organizationsand the Impact of

Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV 587 (2004).
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my other point. When you were summarizing the position of the
commission in terms of what it was seeking, I'm not sure whether you
emphasized the fact that the commission was really seeking a
commitment on the part of the Department of Justice, that they would
not routinely use this as their approach, and the commission never said:
"You have no right under any circumstances to press for a waiver, but it
strikes us as wrong to make this the starting point." So it seems to me,
there's another area for possible compromise, and that would be for the
Justice Department to first affirm that it has no intention of routinely
using this, to secondly articulate the circumstances in which it must use
it, and then third hear from corporate counsel about whether that is a
basis for finding some sort of a middle ground, but the Justice
Department has been adamant that it is, you know, this is not something
that it's willing to negotiate.
PROFESSOR BROWN, JR.: Right. And the language of the two
memoranda, I guess the Thompson Memorandum superseded the Holder
Memorandum, but the language said that it won't be done routinely, and
that's sort of what they want to do about this. It's only supposed to be
resorted to when necessary, and it should be considered as only one
factor, and sort of a funny observation, it's not really funny, but I make
the observation in the paper, one of the changes that Larry Thompson
was making was to delete "only." So it said "only one factor" and now it
says "one factor," which may even suggest that the Justice Department
was subtly de-emphasizing the fact that it wasn't going to be more
aggressive in doing so. In my proposal, besides suggesting that we need
to reconsider the privilege and change it, I also suggest that the
government's got to meet part of the way in keeping with that
suggestion that they have to indicate, they will only seek waiver under
very particular circumstances. So there does have to be some give and
take in this context primarily to protect the information that I think is at
the heart of it, which is legal advice and information that might be
incriminating to the corporation itself.
PROFESSOR POWELL: Well, finally, just one little point, could
you indicate why it is that you think that the Holder Memorandum and
the Thompson Memorandum, so why those were initiated? What were
the precipitating events on what appeared to be a vehicle that wasn't
broken suddenly became broken, and there was the need for the Justice
Department to ratchet up the environment?
PROFESSOR BROWN, JR.: In my paper, I suggest that it was the
corporate scandals and the change in the overall environment, the
perception that there was a need to get to the bottom of these scandals
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quickly, and more importantly, I think the hope was to encourage
corporate compliance-to get corporations to sort of develop compliance
programs as a matter of practice. They just had to do it, and by
ratcheting it up some more, maybe you increase the level of corporate
compliance, and certainly, the main argument is, I think one of the most
notable cases on the selective waiver is Judge Boggs of the Sixth Circuit.
He emphasizes the importance of the policy-the government policy.
Just to be able to ferret it out, corporate wrongdoing, in an efficient and
cost effective manner. That's good for everybody. That's good for the
entire public, so we ought to encourage that, and because the attorneyclient privilege is a common law doctrine, we as the court, we can play
with this a little bit. I'm simplifying. That's kind of what Judge Boggs
said. I think that he is correct, in that I think that was the policy incentive
in part behind it. Maybe there was something a little more sinister in
terms of why it was adopted. But it's interesting that two different
administrations emphasized pretty much the same thing. The only
significant difference in the Thompson Memorandum is that he's a little
more hard core on corporations impeding investigations-they now set
up joint representation arrangements between the individual employees
and the corporation, and his Memo suggests that this may be impeding
the investigation itself, which I think that actually-that aspect of the
Thompson Memorandum has not been emphasized, but it will upset
corporate counsel I think as much if not more so than the compelledvoluntary waiver issue.
PROFESSOR NEEDHAM: Carol Needham from St. Louis
University. I wanted to invite you to expand a little more on the
normative. When should the government seek voluntary waiver and
when should it maybe not be resisted when it is not actually waived,
have you thought at all about it?
PROFESSOR BROWN, JR.: The memo says when it's necessary,
and I haven't fully considered when it would be absolutely necessary,
but I would think it would have to be when there's no other way to
obtain that particular information. I'm not proposing some kind of a
qualified type privilege, but I think, in terms of waiver, maybe that's
what it would be, akin to what we have with work product. But if they
could demonstrate that there is this information that is essential to
government's investigation, and there is no way otherwise to be obtained
in that instance, I think they may say you need to waive the privilege. I
could think of instances of information being destroyed, and they have
to be recreated or maybe just-I think it would be a high-I would want
it to be a pretty high level for the government to have to meet to
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establish that it truly was in need of that information, but I think my
hope would be that this wouldn't happen that much at all. It wouldn't be
that much of a need. If we hold them to their representation, that's what
they really want to do is to facilitate their investigation or their review of
the corporate investigation by looking at factual information, then it
shouldn't be that big of an issue, and my conversations with certain
individuals at Justice suggest that that's really what they want. They
actually are more interested in work product than they are in attorneyclient privilege information, and work product is more apt to be found
selectively waivable judicially. There would be a selective waiver, not
iron clad, but there's a better chance to make that argument. I spend
most of the time talking about the attorney-client privilege but I sort of
dump the work product in there as well. I don't think there are as many
concerns on the work product front, unless it's opinion work product, as
there are on the privilege front.
PROFESSOR LERMAN: I'm Lisa Lerman of the Catholic
University School of Law. This is really not my field, but your talk is
very interesting and getting me curious, so one thing I was wondering
about is what we know about the extent to which the protection of the
privilege actually results in a higher degree of corporate compliance,
because it sort of seems like if you picture corporations trying to hide
information, then you think the waiver request is very reasonable and if
you picture the sort of prototype corporation trying to do investigation to
ensure compliance with the law, and they are kind of doing good internal
regulations and stuff, then you would want the privilege to be protected.
So one question is, do we know anything about that, and then the second
question just kind of taking off on Carol's question, whether it might
make sense to have one factor in whether it's reasonable to request a
waiver of the privilege be the particular corporate track record on prior
internal compliance activity?
PROFESSOR BROWN, JR.: Okay, so your first question was?
PROFESSOR LERMAN: What's going on in the corporate world?
How often do internal investigations result in a higher degree of
compliance than you would have with a lesser degree of privilege?
PROFESSOR BROWN, JR.: I mean, I don't know whether-I'm
not sure actually-I guess you could figure it out by looking at the track
record. The corporation that may have misbehaved once, now are they
being good after the fact?
PROFESSOR LERMAN: What, if anything, is known about the
way that the internal corporate investigation has changed and what result
they produce? I don't know.
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PROFESSOR BROWN, JR.: By the way they conduct their
investigations?
PROFESSOR LERMAN: Yes.
PROFESSOR BROWN, JR.: Well, I think the argument would be
that if anything, the investigations may have gone south as a result of the
waiver issue because of the side effects that are alleged, corporate
counsel-Burnele suggested that they're actually not writing things
down. I think it's very dangerous, because it's somewhat unrealistic, I
think because lawyers have a duty of competence and they are also
concerned about their own personal liability-I suppose, so to try to do
it just in your mind as opposed to having a record, and if something goes
wrong, you don't have a document. I find it hard to believe that that's
being done. The suggestion is compelled waiver has forced lawyers to
do this. In addition, being less forthcoming during an internal
investigation than before compelled voluntary waiver or extensive
review of your investigation, the suggestion is now that's the case. I tend
to disagree with that as well, because I mentioned in my talk that I think
that employees are somewhat skeptical anyway of their communication.
I don't think that it's improved, and I certainly don't think corporations
could tell you that the corporate compliance effort has improved and, if
anything, the government may have made the situation worse by
enacting these waiver provisions overall.
PROFESSOR LERMAN: So my other question was just about, if
you were going to start running a list of possible criteria when it was
proper to ask for waiver-I suppose corporations like other institutions
have prior records of compliance and you might know something about
previous voluntary efforts.
PROFESSOR BROWN, JR.: Yes, and there are voluntary programs
in place. Upjohn was the result of a voluntary program put in place by
the SEC. I think the EPA has got some voluntary programs in place for
disclosure. And I don't think that voluntary disclosure without the
government finding out first that that should be a factorPROFESSOR LERMAN: Right.
PROFESSOR BROWN, JR.:-certainly a factor in determining
cooperation. It ought to be a factor certainly as to whether or not the
government should take it up a notch, and say, okay, now you waive the
privilege. One of the biggest concerns that I've found in my research
with regard to corporate counsel is that they now request increasingly for
waiver at the outset of the investigation. So the corporation may suggest,
we found out something, and we're going to conduct an investigation,
then the DOJ says, okay, great, waive the privilege now. That's the most
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dangerous, because you're waiving the privilege in the future. As to
what, you don't even know, and I think that is a real problem. It may be
a factor in or affect negatively how the corporation carries out its
investigation, and that's the one big argument; they need to stop asking
for waiver in this context altogether-that's inappropriate.
PROFESSOR LERMAN: Yeah. You can even question whether it
would be valid, right, if there's a waiver thatPROFESSOR BROWN, JR.: A future waiver, yeah.
PROFESSOR LERMAN: Future waiver, right.
PROFESSOR SIMON: Roy Simon. Hofstra. Is it realistic at all to
think about a statute that would say that a voluntary waiver to the United
States Department of Justice does not constitute a waiver to thirdparties? Would that help the situation at all in terms of making it more
palatable for corporations to waive the attorney-client privilege in
government investigations knowing that they would then not be waiving
with respect to class action plaintiff suits?
PROFESSOR BROWN, JR.: And that's the selective waiver notion
which I don't think will work, only because the courts have rejected it.
There could be-it could be enacted legislatively, it has been attempted,
but has not at this point been successful. I think you still have the
potential side effect problems, although they would be reduced, because
you don't have the broad waiver, so I think you're right, and that's a
pretty popular approach, but it's more popular for the Department of
Justice. They want selective waiver. I don't think corporate counsel is all
gung-ho about the notion of selective waiver. I didn't talk about
implementation in connection with my proposal-because there are
really only two ways that it could be. One way would be for the
Supreme Court to overrule Upjohn, because Upjohn is the law, and
we're talking about the federal privilege. The other way would be for the
federal government to enact the privilege. There could be legislation
enacted that would supersede Upjohn, and I would hope that in doing so,
even though we still have states doing different things in terms of
privilege, the real quandary for corporate counsel, if they think about it,
is they don't-aren't sure what privilege law is going to apply. I would
hope the states might follow suit and decide-maybe we need to create
predictability and have a more uniform attorney-client privilege. And I
think if the ABA, as the foremost purveyor of model rules, would
endorse a model corporate privilege that states might be willing to adopt,
it would help corporate counsel's position a lot. [Applause]
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